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ABSTRACT

Three Essays on US Agricultural Insurance

by

Taehoo Kim, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2016

Major Professor: Dr. Man-Keun Kim
Department: Applied Economics

Many economists and policy analysts have conducted studies on crop insurance.
Three research gaps are identified: i) moral hazard in prevented planting (PP), ii) choice
of PP and planting a second crop, and iii) selecting margin protection in the Dairy Margin
Protection Program (MPP-Dairy).
The first essay analyzes the existence of moral hazard in PP. The PP provision is
defined as the “failure to plant an insured crop by the final planting date due to adverse
events”. If the farmer decides not to plant a crop, the farmer receives a PP indemnity. Late
planting (LP) is an option for the farmer to plant a crop while maintaining crop insurance
after the final planting date. Crop insurance may alter farmers’ behavior in selecting PP or
LP and could increase the likelihood of PP claims even though farmers can choose LP.
This study finds evidence that a farmer with higher insurance coverage tends to choose
PP more often (moral hazard). Spatial panel models attest to the existence of moral hazard
in PP empirically.
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If a farmer chooses PP, s/he receives the PP indemnity and may either leave the
acreage unplanted or plant a second crop, e.g., soybean for corn. If the farmer plants a
second crop after the PP claim, the farmer receives a 35% of PP payment. The current
PP provision fails to provide farmers with an incentive to plant a second crop; 99.9% of
PP claiming farmers do not plant a second crop. Adjusting PP indemnity payment may
encourage farmers to plant a second crop. The second essay explores this question using
a stochastic simulation and suggests to increase the PP payment by 10%-15%.
The third essay investigates why Wisconsin dairy farmers purchase more
supplementary protection than California farmers in a MPP-Dairy introduced in the 2014
Farm Bill. MPP-Dairy provides dairy producers with margin protection when the national
dairy margin is below a farmer selected threshold. This study determines whether
conditional probabilities regarding regional and national margins have a role in farmer’s
decision-making to purchase supplementary coverages using Copula models. Results
indicate that Wisconsin farmers have higher conditional probabilities and purchase more
buy-up coverages.

(110 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Three Essays on US Agricultural Insurance
Taehoo Kim

Agricultural insurance programs such as crop insurance and Dairy Margin
Protection program (MPP-Dairy) are managed by United State Department of Agriculture
(USDA). The objective of these programs is to help farmers manage their financial risk.
Agricultural insurance programs have played an important role for farmers in terms of
maintaining farm profitability. There are several potential problems with insurance
programs, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, which make them inefficient
With respect to these problems, three research gaps are identified: i) moral hazard
in prevented planting (PP), ii) choice of PP and planting a second crop, and iii) selecting
margin protection in the Dairy Margin Protection Program (MPP-Dairy). Theories and
empirical results show that moral hazard exists in PP, meaning that a farmer who
purchases a higher coverage level is likely to abandon cropping when the farmer
experiences adverse events such as drought or excess moisture. Second, the farmer may
not plant a second crop due to a low PP indemnity payment. Increasing the PP indemnity
payment provides an incentive for the farmer to plant a second crop. Third, dairy farmers
purchase more supplementary protection in MPP-Dairy when co-movement of dairy
margins between US and regions is stronger.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Federal Crop Insurance Program
The Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) has grown over the past two decades
(Figure 1-1) which is administered by the Risk Management Agency (RMA) within the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and delivered by private insurers. FCIP
provides yield protection to farmers to help cover yield losses from various types of natural
disasters including, but not limited to, drought, excessive moisture, freeze, and disease.
Newer coverage options seek to combine yield protection and price protection to protect
farmers against potential revenue loss, whether due to low yields (yield protection),
decrease in market price (revenue protection) or a mixture of both.
The RMA sets the premium rates that can be charged to farmers and determines
which crops can and cannot be insured. Private insurance companies are then obligated
to sell insurance indiscriminately to eligible farmers. To reduce the cost to farmers, the
federal government subsidizes the farmer-paid premiums which are highly dependent on
the type of insurance coverage and policy. The federal government also provides
reimbursement to the private insurance companies to offset operating and administrative
costs that would otherwise be paid by farmers as part of their premium.
The 2014 Farm Bill eliminated direct payments and expanded crop insurance
shifting the major means of agricultural supports to the crop insurance program. Hence,
crop insurance became the central (federal) agricultural policy even though it might be
expensive to taxpayers (Wright 2014). In 2014 alone, the program insured approximately
$110 billion in liabilities (liability in Figure 1-1) on 294 million acres nationwide (net acre
insured in Figure 1-1). Since 1996, insurance policies with a premium remained steady at
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about 1.2 million (policies with premium in Figure 1-1) but the net acre insured and liability
has grown significantly (Figure 1-1). Steep increase in policies with a premium in 1995
was partly due to a substantial rise of premium subsidies in legislative actions in 1994
(Plastina and Hart 2014) and partly because of the new requirement of purchasing crop
insurance to obtain other agricultural supports payments, which was eliminated in the
1996 Farm Bill (Plastina and Hart 2014).

Figure 1-1. US Crop Insurance
Note: Steep increase in policies with premium in 1995 is the result of substantial rise of premium
subsidies and subscription to receive the other supportive federal program in legislative actions in
1994.
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1.1.1. Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance
It is by now well known that crop insurance may alter farmers’ production practices
to increase the likelihood of receiving an indemnity (moral hazard). Numerous studies,
e.g., Chambers (1989), Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), Smith and Goodwin (1996),
Babcock and Hennessy (1996), Wu (1999), and Chambers and Quiggin (2002), have
examined whether crop insurance affects a farmers’ production behavior. Each of these
studies shows that there exist changes in input use, i.e., fertilizer and chemicals, validating
the assumption that moral hazard exists. In other words, farmers who purchase crop
insurance tend to reduce input applications (Smith and Goodwin 1996) or increase (riskincreasing) input use (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993) to increase the likelihood of
receiving an indemnity.
1.1.2. Crop Yield Distribution
Proper calculation of the insurance premium is important. The RMA incorporates
the distribution of crop yield in the calculation of the revenue insurance premium rate.
Many studies, e.g., Nelson and Preckel (1989), Sherrick et al. (2004), and Woodard and
Sherrick (2011), have attempted to find the best-fitting crop-yield distribution that would
most accurately calculate this premium for farmers.
1.1.3. Subsidizing Crop Insurance
The role of insurance-premium subsidization has been highly debated in the
literatures (Goodwin and Smith 2013; Coble and Barnett 2013; Wright 2014). Historical
data suggests that a crop insurance subsidy encourages farmers to purchase crop
insurance, e.g., the steep increase in policies with premium in 1995 in Figure 1-1. Further,
the crop insurance subsidy reduces the problem of adverse selection, where otherwise
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only farmers with high production risk would participate in the program. Wright (2014) also
points out that crop insurance subsidies have not been prohibited under current WTO
regulations. However, crop insurance subsidies may have unintended impacts such as
alteration of farming practice (moral hazard), expansion of crop lands, and related
environmental concerns. In addition, subsidized crop insurance represents a budgetary
transfer from taxpayers to farmers and private insurance companies, resulting in potential
market distortions (Goodwin and Smith 2013).
1.1.4. Fairness of Premium Rate-making
The fairness of rate-making (loss ratio, total indemnity payments to total premium,
must be one) is vital. Historically, loss ratio has been less than 1 or larger than 1 for a
given crops year (loss ratio in Figure 1-1). Empirical studies by Babcock, Hart, and Hayes
(2004), Woodard, Sherrick, and Schnitkey (2011), and Hu (2013) question whether current
rate-making is fair. If rate-making is unfair, the crop insurance program will be lessened
due to two reasons. First, farmers that incur a loss due to an unfair rate may choose not
to participate in the crop insurance program in the future. Second, only farmers that make
a gain from unfair rates would likely participate in the crop insurance program (Goodwin
1994). In other words, there exists a potential adverse selection problem.
1.1.5. Time Dependence of Yield Risk
The premium and indemnity depend on historical yield, which is known as the
Actual Production History (APH). Both are biased downward over time due to
technological advances that positively affect yield (Woodard et al. 2012). Since 2012, the
RMA has implemented a trend-adjusted APH.
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1.1.6. Research Gaps in the Crop Insurance Literature
Two research gaps in the crop insurance literature are identified: (i) the existence
of moral hazard due to prevented planting (PP) program and (ii) understanding the
farmer’s decision-making process with respect to planting a second crop.
The PP provision is defined as the “failure to plant an insured crop by the final
planting date, or within any applicable late planting (LP) period,” due to adverse events
such as excess moisture or drought (2013 Crop Insurance Handbook, USDA-RMA 2013).
If a farmer decides not to plant a crop, s/he receives a PP indemnity. PP payments
currently represent the large share of total indemnity in crop insurance programs. PP
payments accounted for only 9% of total indemnity payments on average, from 1998 to
2008. From 2009 to 2013, however, PP payments accounted for roughly 17% of total
indemnity payments. Farmers tend to choose PP in lieu of LP. This paper examines the
existence of moral hazard in the choice of PP and LP. In particular, this paper tests the
hypothesis that a farmer with a higher insurance coverage tend to choose PP more often.
If a farmer chooses PP, s/he receives the PP indemnity and may either leave the
acreage unplanted or plant a second crop, e.g., soybean for corn. If the farmer plants a
second crop, the farmer receives a reduced PP payment (currently, 35% of PP indemnity).
The current reduced PP payment fails to provide farmers with an incentive to plant a
second crop (99.9% of PP claiming farmers do not plant the second crop). Adjusting
reduced PP indemnity payment may therefore encourage farmers to plant a second crop.
The objective of the second study is to find and suggest the optimal percentage of reduced
PP payment that may encourage farmers to plant a second crop.
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1.2. Dairy Margin Protection Program
The Dairy Margin Protection Program (MPP-Dairy) administered by Farm Service
Agency (FAS), USDA, is a financial risk management tool for dairy producers. The 2014
Farm Bill authorized the MPP-Dairy, which offers dairy producers protection of their milk
production margin, income-over-feed-cost (IOFC) (Newton, Thraen, and Bozic 2015). The
MPP-Dairy includes catastrophic coverage with an annual $100 administrative fee, and
eight buy-up margin coverage levels with premium that varies with the level of protection
(MPP dairy fact sheet 2014). The national dairy production margin is defined as the
difference between the all-milk price and average feed costs (MPP dairy factsheet 2014).
If the national average IOFC margin falls below $4/cwt (catastrophic coverage), MPPDairy provides indemnity payments to dairy farmers. Dairy farmers can purchase buy-up
(supplementary) coverages with increase in $0.5/cwt up to $8.0/cwt (MPP dairy fact sheet
2014). The program’s objective is that dairy producers, regardless of size, geographic
location, or management practice, are offered self-selected protection levels against a
drop in milk prices, rising feed costs, or a mixture of both (Newton and Thraen 2014).
2015 MPP-Dairy coverage data by states indicates that, for western states except
Washington and Montana, less than 36% of those enrolled in the program purchased buyup protection. As a reference, California (CA), which is the largest dairy producing state in
the U.S., had only 29% of the enrolled dairy farms buying supplementary coverage, i.e.,
the majority-enrolled only purchased catastrophic coverage. In contrast, more than 50%
of enrolled dairy producers in mid-western and eastern states bought buy-up coverages.
For example, Wisconsin (WI), the second largest dairy producing state in the U.S., had
56% of enrolled producers buying supplementary coverages. Figure 1-2 shows the MPPDairy participation rates across margin protections in CA and WI. As shown, the
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distribution of MPP-Dairy participation rates differs in both regions. More than 70% of CA
dairy producers solely purchased catastrophic protection, while 44% of WI producers
enrolled solely in catastrophic protection. Instead, WI dairy farms bought buy-up coverage
levels of $6/cwt and $6.5/cwt, and even the maximum protection level of $8/cwt.

Figure 1-2. MPP-Dairy participation rate and margin protection in CA and WI in 2014
Note: Participation rate is the proportion of dairy producers who purchase dairy margin protection.
$4/cwt is catastrophic coverage. Producers may purchase buy-up coverage that provides
payments when margins are between $4.00 and $8.00/cwt.

The third essay explores this question, i.e., why western producers (CA producers)
purchase less/lower buy-up levels than mid-western producers (WI producers). The study
determines whether conditional probabilities regarding regional and national IOFC
margins have a role in dairymens’ decisions to purchase supplementary coverage at
different levels.
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1.3. Structure of Dissertation
In sum, three board research gaps are identified in this dissertation, namely 1) moral
hazard in prevented planting and late planting, 2) the role of decision making with respect
to prevented planting and planting a second crop, and 3) the role of conditional probability
in determining dairy margin protection levels. This dissertation begins a discussion on
these gaps in the crop insurance and MPP-Dairy literature.
Chapter two presents an overview of the literature regarding crop insurance and
MPP-Dairy. The existence of moral hazard in prevented planting and late planting is
examined in chapter three. Expected utility theory, stochastic simulation, and empirical
analyses are presented. Chapter four investigates the relationship between the PP
payment and planting a second crop and simulates how adjusting reduced PP indemnity
payment can encourage farmers to plant a second crop. Chapter five investigates the role
of conditional probability in influencing the dairy producers’ decision-making on
purchasing supplementary margin protections in MPP-Dairy. Finally, chapter six provides
a summary of findings and concludes the dissertation.

9

2. LITERATURE REVIEW IN GENERAL
Chapter two reviews general literature regarding U.S. crop insurance and Margin
Protection Program for Dairy Producers (MPP-Dairy).
2.1. Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance
Since the 1980s the US crop insurance program has been available to help
farmers manage their yield and price risk. Researchers have investigated whether the
crop insurance program gives farmers an incentive to change their production practices
to receive more insurance indemnity (moral hazard) (Chambers 1989; Horowitz and
Lichtenberg 1993; Smith and Goodwin 1996; Babcock and Hennessy 1996; Coble et al.
1997; Chambers and Quiggin 2002; Roberts, Key, and O’Dononghue 2006).
These studies have examined the existence of moral hazard in crop insurance,
focusing primarily on the production input-use side. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) study
moral hazard by examining how corn farmers in the Corn Belt change fertilizer and
pesticide use with crop insurance. They conclude that farmers who purchase crop
insurance use more fertilizer and pesticides than those who do not purchase. However,
both fertilizer and pesticides are risk-increasing inputs (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993),
meaning that the more fertilizer and pesticide use could be considered to be a moral
hazard.
Smith and Goodwin (1996) investigate the prevalence of moral hazard induced
through crop insurance by examining the relationship between chemical use and crop
insurance purchases for Kansas wheat farmers. Their main result conflicts with that of
Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), as they find that farmers with crop insurance use less
chemicals. Babcock and Hennessy (1996) also analyze the relationship between crop
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insurance and fertilizer application for the representative corn farmer in Iowa and show
that farmers who purchase crop insurance are likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer
applications.
Coble et al. (1997) test for the existence of moral hazard in crop production using
panel dataset of Kansas wheat farms. They show that moral hazard exists when the crop
environment is unfavorable, e.g., drought, but does not exist under favorable
environments, e.g., good weather. They argue that cross sectional studies, such as those
of Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) and Smith and Goodwin (1996), do not allow for
adequate measurement of moral hazard in crop insurance.
Wu (1999) studies the effect of crop insurance on crop mix and chemical use in
the Central Nebraska Basin. He concludes that crop insurance affects crop mix and
chemical use. Chambers and Quiggin (2002) investigate the effects of area-yield
insurance 1 on producer’s behavior in crop production. They claim that area-yield
insurance is not different from other risk management tools available to farmers.
Roberts, Key, and O’Dononghue (2006) estimate the incidence of moral hazard
using crop insurance administration data. They argue that previous studies did not control
for endogeneity of the insurance decision since “insurance adoption is not randomly
assigned”, in an empirical analysis. To adjust for a non-random assignment of insurance
adoption, the authors apply the difference-in-difference method and conclude that moral
hazard exists among wheat and soybeans farms in Texas.

Crop insurance for both premium rates and indemnities to be based not on the farmer’s individual
yield but rather on the aggregate yield of a surrounding area (Miranda 1991).
1
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2.2. Crop Yield Distribution
It is crucial to identify which distribution best describes crop-yield variability since
a crop-yield distribution must be pre-selected to estimate yield risk and ultimately
determine the insurance premium rate. The RMA currently uses a censored normal
distribution based on county level crop yield data provided by the National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS) (Coble et al. 2010). However, researchers disagree on whether
use of the censored normal distribution is appropriate (Coble et al. 2010).
Just and Weninger (1999) argue that the common assertion of non-normality of
the yield distribution is not appropriate and suggest that normality of yield distribution is
reasonable when researchers assess crop insurance programs. Atwood, Shaik, and Watts
(2002) conduct a normality test using farm-level data of six crops: corn, soybean, wheat,
cotton, sorghum and barley. They conclude that crop yield is distributed non-normal. They
also examine the effect of crop insurance premiums under the normality assumption and
data-based empirical distributions. They show that the premiums based on normal vs nonnormal distribution are significantly different.
Sherrick et al. (2004) assess variety of crop yield distributions. They compare five
distributions - normal, logistic, Weibull, beta, lognormal - according to mean percentage
difference in expected payouts to corn and soybean. They show that choice of distribution
can result in significantly large differences in indemnity payments.
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2.3. Subsidizing Crop Insurance2
Recently, crop insurance subsidies have increased largely due to i) increases in
the subsidy rate itself (2000: 37%, 2006: 58%, and 2012: 63%), ii) increases in crop price,
iii) increases in enrolled acres, iv) increases in coverage level (2000: 56%, 2006: 71%,
2012: 72%, weighted average for corn and soybean), and v) radical shift from yield
protection to revenue protection(revenue protection3, 2000: 38%, 2006: 61%, 2012: 79%
for corn and soybean).
Coble and Barnett (2013) discuss implications associated with these increases; i)
higher crop insurance subsidies induce higher participation in crop insurance programs,
ii) there is a correlation between the increase in crop insurance purchases and reduced
ex-post disaster assistance even if there seem not to be sufficient evidence to show a
causal relationship between them, iii) there are regional differences in received subsidies
due to the difference in degree of the risk, iv) higher crop insurance subsidies mask the
adverse selection and moral hazard effects, and v) induced rent-seeking; the most farmer
organization are opt to prefer crop insurance program to other farm policy programs, such
as direct payment or counter-cyclical, or Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE)
programs.
As Goodwin and Smith (2013) point out, the crop insurance subsidy can also alter
farming practices and lead to expansion of crop lands and related environmental
concerns. In addition, subsidized crop insurance represents a budgetary transfer from

The numbers in section 2.3. are from author’s calculation using summary of business data
provided by the RMA.
3 Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Revenue Assurance (RA), Income Protection (IP), Revenue
Protection (RP) and Revenue Protection Harvest Price Exclusion (RP-HPE) are included to
calculate the percentage.
2
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taxpayers to farmers and private insurance companies which can lead to market
distortions.
2.4. Fairness of Rate-Making and Time Dependence of Yield Risk
The major technique used to determine the crop insurance premium rate is known
as Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) rate-making. MPCI rate-making depends on the
loss cost ratio (LCR) approach. MPCI rate-making has been widely criticized because of
potential biasedness and inefficiencies in determination of coverage guarantees (Skees
and Reed 1986), state excess loads (Josephson, Lord, and Mitchell 2000), and intracounty yield risk heterogeneity (Goodwin 1994). Recently, researchers have focused on
the time dependence of yield risk (Umarov 2009; Woodard et al. 2012; Adhikari, Knight,
and Belasco 2013). That is, since measurement of Actual Production History (APH) is
based on a simple moving average yield over four to ten years, the premium and indemnity
based on APH is downward biased due to advances in crop-yield technology. Moreover,
farmers have complained that the current APH calculation does not reflect technical
advances. In response to these criticisms, the RMA introduced the Trend Adjusted Actual
Production History (TA-APH) pilot program in the 2012 crop year primarily in the CornBelt regions and has expanded to other regions.
2.5. Dairy Margin Protection Program
Few studies are available regarding the MPP-Dairy. A handful of Farmdoc
publications, such as Newton and Thraen (2014), Newton and Bozic (2014), and Newton
and Balagtas (2015) address the MPP-Dairy. This is partly because the MPP-Dairy is a
relatively new policy option included in the 2014 Farm Bill. Historically, dairy policy has
been designed to increase dairy farmers’ income (Newton, Thraen, and Bozic 2015).
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Among others, Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) in 2002 Farm Bill had provided income
support based on a target milk price. In MILC, a dairy producer receives direct payment
that is equal to 45% of the difference between the fluid milk price and a reference price,
16.94/cwt, when the fluid milk price is lower than the reference price. Program participants
can receive payments on only maximum 2.4 million pounds (Price 2004). Since MILC is
premised on the assumption of stable, MILC program has failed to provide a safety net for
dairy farms in the face of the recent rise in feed prices. The 2008 Farm Bill adopted
variable reference pricing whenever weighted feed cost is above $7.35/cwt (Schnepf
2012).
The 2014 Farm Bill replaced income and commodity price support programs with
Margin Protection Program for Dairy Producers (MPP-Dairy) to protect farmers’ incomeover-feed-cost (IOFC) margins rather than the milk price per se (Farm Service Agency
2011). The MPP-Dairy includes catastrophic coverage, at no cost to the producer other
than an annual $100 administrative fee. Various levels of buy-up coverage are offered
with premiums that vary with the level of protection (Newton, Thraen, and Bozic 2015).
Catastrophic coverage provides payments to participating producers when the national
dairy production margin is below $4/cwt. Producers may purchase buy-up coverage for
national margins that range from $4.50/cwt to $8.00/cwt, rising by increments of $0.50.
The program’s objective is to ensure that dairy producers, regardless of their size,
geographic location or management practices, are offered self-selected protection levels
against declines in milk prices, rising feed costs, or a mixture of both (Newton and Thraen
2014; Newton, Thraen, and Bozic 2015).
Perhaps the first MPP-Dairy study is Newton and Thraen (2014) which classifies
the MPP-Dairy as a dairy safety net. Newton and Bozic (2014) also explain how the MPP-
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Dairy works and evaluate milk price levels required to trigger the MPP-Dairy. Newton and
Balagtas (2015) explore the MPP-Dairy participation pattern particularly the relationship
between the farm size (in terms of annual average milk production) and participation rate.
They find that the MPP-Dairy participation rate is positively related to dairy farm operation
size across states. They also find that purchase of the buy-up option is negatively related
to farm operation size across states. They point out that states with larger average dairy
farm size tend to exhibit higher participation rates since the $100 administration fee is
relatively small for larger dairy farms (Newton and Balagtas 2015). Novakovic et al. (2015)
summarize the enrollment data for the MPP-Dairy program. They find that there is low
negative correlation between enrollment rate and the number of farms in a state, and
positive correlation between enrollment rate and average farm size across states, too.
Also, they find that participation rate for supplementary coverage level of eastern states is
higher than that of western states.
Newton, Thraen, and Bozic (2015) argue that MPP-Dairy has led to higher
taxpayer costs compared with prior dairy farm support programs. Two reasons are
suggested. First, dairy farmers may be able to predict the national dairy margins quite
accurately using publicly available information from futures markets, which in turn allows
them to maximize program returns. Second, the lack of production constraints shifts
benefits toward larger dairy farms and causes more burden to the US budget.
Regarding the dairy production margin, which is defined as the difference between
all-milk price and feed costs, Bozic et al. (2012) shows that the dairy margin exhibits a
slow mean-reverting path over time when the margins are very high or very low. Their
findings can be used to design strategies for managing margins, especially in a futures
market.
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Bozic et al. (2014) explore the method to determine Livestock Gross Margin
Insurance for Dairy Cattle (LGM-Dairy) which is the previous dairy support program. They
point out that the current rate-making method using a Gaussian copula fails to capture
crucial features of milk and feed markets. They find that, since 2005, the dependence
between milk price and corn price has become stronger compared to 1990~2005. This is
because the number of larger dairy farms (> 1000 dairy cattle) has increased over time,
and most of large farms purchase their feed from the grain markets. It ties milk price and
corn price strongly which causes stronger tail dependence which is not captured in the
Gaussian copula.
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3. MORAL HAZARD IN PREVENTED PLANTING
Abstract
This study examines the existence of moral hazard associated with the choices of
prevented planting (PP) and late planting (LP). The PP provision is defined as the “failure
to plant an insured crop by the final planting date due to adverse events” such as excess
moisture or drought. If the farmer decides not to plant the crop, (after appraised by an
agency) the farmer receives a PP indemnity. LP is an option for the farmer to plant the
crop and still maintain the crop insurance when the farmer fails to plant crop by the final
planting date. However, by choosing the LP option the farmer receive a lower the
insurance coverage level depending upon the LP date due to potential yield loss. Crop
insurance may alter farmers’ decision choices in the selection of PP or LP. In other words,
crop insurance can increase the likelihood of PP claims even though farmers can choose
LP. In particular, this paper seeks to explain why a farmer with higher insurance coverage
would tend to choose PP statistically more often, i.e., exhibit moral hazard. A stochastic
simulation driven by expected utility theory demonstrates the existence of moral hazard in
PP numerically. Spatial panel econometrics models attest to the existence of moral hazard
in PP empirically.

Key Words: Crop Insurance, Moral hazard, Prevented Planting, Late Planting
JEL Codes: D81, G22, Q12, Q14
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3.1. Introduction
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) has included prevented planting (PP) in
crop insurance programs since 1998. The PP provision is defined as the “failure to plant
an insured crop by the final planting date, or within any applicable late planting (LP)
period,” due to adverse events such as excess moisture or drought (2013 Crop Insurance
Handbook, USDA-RMA 2013). If a farmer with a base PP coverage level (base PP) claims
PP payments, 60% (varies from 25% to 60% depending upon the specific crop insured)
of the original liability is paid as an indemnity4 on approval of the insurer. The farmer also
can choose buy-up PP coverage level of 5% and 10%. In this case, PP payments are
given at 65% and 70% of the original liability, respectively.
PP payments account for a growing large share of total indemnity from crop
insurance programs. For example, PP payments accounted for roughly 9% of total
indemnity on average from 1998 to 2008. From 2009 to 2013, however, PP payments
accounted for 17% of total indemnity. In 2010 the share of PP payments increased to
approximately 29% of total indemnity (author’s calculation using Cause of Loss Historical
Data Files from RMA).
Late planting (LP) is another option that a farmer may choose when s/he fails to
plant a crop in the normal planting period. Choosing LP maintains his/her crop insurance,
but the farmer does not receive PP indemnity and has to lower the insurance coverage
level depending upon the LP date due to potential yield loss (1% per day after final plating

4

PP indemnity payments depend on insurance coverage level, buy-up PP, and choice of a second
crop after late planting date. For example, if a farmer buys 75% coverage level with base PP, s/he
receives indemnity, PP indemnity = 0.75*0.60*APH*price election*claimed acre, where APH is the
actual production history. When s/he chooses to plant a second crop, s/he receives 35% of the PP
indemnity.
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date).5 Figure 3-1 presents the timeline for the choice between PP and LP as well as PP
options for a second crop after claiming PP.
As evidenced by the recent increase in PP payments, farmers tend to choose PP
in lieu of LP. Rejesus et al. (2003) and Rejesus, Escalante, and Lovell (2005) show that
crop insurance provides farmers with an incentive to choose PP. In other words, crop
insurance may increase the likelihood of PP claims even though farmers have the option
of choosing LP. In this case moral hazard is observed. If moral hazard exists in PP,
farmers are inefficiently abandoning cropland. Abandoning cropland in a given year leads
to two problems. First, insurance premium subsidies paid to farmers has a negative effect
on production because no crop is produced. Second, it is a contradiction of the goal of
USDA that promotes agricultural production to improve food security (USDA’s strategic
Plan FY 2010-2015, Goal 3) (OIG 2013).
This paper examines the existence of moral hazard associated with the choice of
PP and LP and, in particular, seeks to explain why a farmer with higher insurance
coverage tends to choose PP. Specifically, this paper investigates the prevalence of moral
hazard by examining the effects of crop insurance, its type, and coverage level on the
farmer’s PP decision. An Intra-seasonal expected utility maximization model for the
representative farmer is developed in the context of a stochastic simulation. Further,
spatial panel econometrics models are developed to uncover the relationship between the
PP ratio and coverage level.

5

For example, the coverage level is lowered to 0.75*0.95=0.7125, if the insured purchases an
insurance plan with a 75% coverage level and plants the crop after 5 days of the final planting date.
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Figure 3-1. Timeline for choice between prevented planting and late planting
Note: PP = prevented planting, LP = late planting, CV = cover crop, SC = second crop
Dates are for the typical farm in Iowa. Some texts which are not discussed in this paper are greyed
out

3.2. Literature Review
Several studies have examined moral hazard in crop insurance, focusing primarily
on production inputs. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) study moral hazard by examining
how corn farmers in the Corn Belt change fertilizer and pesticide use with crop insurance.
They conclude that farmers who purchase crop insurance use more fertilizer and
pesticides than those who do not.
Smith and Goodwin (1996) test for the existence of moral hazard in crop insurance
by examining the relationship between chemical use and crop insurance purchases by
Kansas wheat farms. Contrary to Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), they conclude that
farmers with crop insurance use fewer chemicals. Babcock and Hennessy (1996) also
analyze the relationship between crop insurance and fertilizer application for a
representative corn farmer in Iowa, and show that farmers who purchase crop insurance
are more likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer applications.
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Coble et al. (1997) test for moral hazard in crop production using a panel dataset
of Kansas wheat farms. They find that moral hazard exists solely when the cropping
environment is unfavorable, e.g., drought, and does not exists under favorable
environments. They argue that single-year cross-sectional data, approach used in
previous studies by Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) and Smith and Goodwin (1996), are
inadequate for testing for the existence of moral hazard.
Wu (1999) studies the effect of crop insurance on crop mix and chemical use in
the Central Nebraska Basin. He concludes that crop insurance affects crop mix and
chemical use. Chambers and Quiggin (2002) investigate the effects of area-yield
insurance 6 on producer’s behavior in crop production. They claim that area-yield
insurance is not different from other risk management tools available to farmers.
Roberts, Key, and O’Dononghue (2006) estimate the incidence of moral hazard
using crop insurance administration data. They argue that previous studies did not control
for endogeneity of the insurance decision since “insurance adoption is not randomly
assigned”, in an empirical analysis. To adjust for a non-random assignment of insurance
adoption, the authors apply the difference-in-difference method and conclude that moral
hazard exists among wheat and soybeans farms in Texas.
There exist few studies focused on PP. Rejesus et al. (2003) empirically analyze
potential fraudulence in PP claims. They show that higher insurance coverage level
induces more fraudulent PP claims. Moreover, they find that revenue protection leads to
more fraudulent PP claims than that associated with yield protection. Rejesus Escalante
and Lovell (2005) also analyze the relationship between PP claims, land ownership, and

Crop insurance for both premium rates and indemnities to be based not on the farmer’s individual
yield but rather on the aggregate yield of a surrounding area (Miranda 1991).
6
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farm business structure. They find that a tenant under a leasing contract has an increased
the likelihood of claiming more PP. They also find that sole ownership and partnership
farms claim more PP than cooperative farms.
This study differs from Rejesus et al. (2003) in two respects. First, this study
investigates the evidence of moral hazard in choosing PP, not committing PP fraud.
Second, Rejesus et al. (2003) argue that revenue protection insurance leads to more PP
claims (PP fraud) than yield protection insurance. This argument is questionable since
revenue protection schemes such as Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) and Revenue
Assurance Harvest Price Option (RA-HPO) 7 have an option to choose a higher price
between an elected price and harvest price. Thus, if a farmer expects the crop price to be
higher than the elected price at time of harvest, s/he would not file a PP claim, or at least
the probability of filing a claim would be lower.
3.3. Moral Hazard in Insurance Economics
Moral hazard describes a change of the insured’s unobserved behavior caused by
purchase of insurance contract providing protection against risk. Moral hazard has two
different definitions in insurance economics, i.e., ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard.

7

CRC and RA-HPO have been eliminated since 2011. Currently, revenue protection (RP) and
revenue protection harvest price exclusion (RP-HPE) are in operation as crop revenue protection
program. A farmer can choose the higher between elected (guaranteed) price and harvest price in
RP, while s/he cannot choose the higher price in RP-HPE. Close to 99% of corn farmers currently
purchase RP policy not RP-HPE in 2013 (author’s calculation using data from
State/County/Crop/Coverage Level 1989-2015 Data Files and Record Layout, RMA summary of
business Reports and Data).
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3.3.1. Ex-Ante Moral Hazard
Ex-ante moral hazard means the change of insured’s unobserved behavior before
losses occur. For example, a farmer with crop insurance may decrease (or increase) an
input uses compared with farmers without crop insurance, as discussed in Horowitz and
Lichtenberg (1993), Smith and Goodwin (1996), and Coble et al. (1997). This behavior
affects the probability or size of loss. Deductible and co-insurance are well known as
insurance design schemes to mitigate ex-ante moral hazard.
3.3.2. Ex-Post Moral Hazard
Ex-post moral hazard describes the changes of insured’s behavior after losses
occur. If insured has a more comprehensive insurance contract, s/he is more likely to claim
indemnity payments than an insured who has less comprehensive insurance contract.
Economists are more interested in ex-ante moral hazard than ex-post moral hazard in that
ex-ante moral hazard describes the change for insured’s behavior more directly. However,
insurance suppliers are more interested in ex-post moral hazard than ex-ante moral
hazard because ex-post moral hazard is directly related to their profit.
3.3.3. Prevented Planting and Ex-Post Moral Hazard
A farmer claims prevented planting after losses occur. This research examines the
existence of ex-post moral hazard in PP.
3.4. PP and LP Decision Making
Assume that a farmer is risk averse and maximizes expected utility from uncertain
profit at harvesting time. Suppose that, due to adverse events such as drought or excess
moisture, the farmer should choose PP or LP. The farmer is at final planting time (see
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Figure 3-1 PP timeline), i.e., time period 1 ( t = 1), and should make the insurance
decision. If the farmer claims PP at t = 1, s/he obtains the profit from the PP indemnity,
πPP , with certainty, which can be written as
(3-1)

πPP = pg θpp θqAPH − c1 − m − ccv ,

where pg is the elected (guaranteed) price by the RMA (Commodity Exchange Price
Provisions (CEPP) based on data from the futures market), θpp is the PP coverage level
(60%, 65% or 70% depending upon buy-up), and θ is the insurance coverage rate θ ∈
[50%, x], x varying from 75% to 85% in 5% increments. The term qAPH is the farmer’s
actual product history (APH) per acre for the past 4-10 years, c1 is the input cost per acre
for normal planting, m is the crop insurance premium, and ccv is the cost for planting a
cover crop, which is a requirement of any PP claim.
If the farmer chooses LP, s/he obtains profit level,
(3-2)

π
̃LP = [(p̃q̃ − c1 − m − c2 ) + indj ], j = yp, rp,

where tilde above the variable indicates that it is a stochastic variable at t = 1. π
̃LP is the
profit for LP at the harvesting time, t = 2, p̃ is the crop price at t = 2 which is stochastic at
t = 1, q̃ is the yield at t = 2 which is also stochastic at t = 1, c1 is, again, the input cost per
acre for the normal planting of the first crop, and c2 is the cost of LP until the harvesting
time. The term max{0, indj } is the amount of indemnity that the farmer expects at t = 1.
Depending on types of crop insurance, the indemnity can be rewritten as follows. In the
case of yield protection, yp, the indemnity is given by
(3-3)

indyp = pg ∙ max{0, ρθqAPH − q̃},

where, pg is the elected price if a farmer choose 100% of price election, ρ is the coverage
reduction factor depending on late planting date (1% per day after normal planting date),
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θ is the coverage level, qAPH is the APH, and q̃ is the stochastic yield. If the crop yield is
higher than the coverage level, ρθqAPH, the farmer is not eligible for the yield protection
indemnity regardless of the price level at harvest time.
In the case of revenue protection, rp, the indemnity becomes
(3-4)

indrp = max{0, min(2pg , max(pg , p̃)) ∙ ρθqAPH − p̃q̃}.
If the revenue at the harvesting period, p̃q̃, is greater than the covered revenue,

min(2pg , max(pg , p̃)) ∙ ρθqAPH , the farmer does not qualify for the receive revenue
protection indemnity.
To make the decision process simple, suppose the farmer has either yield
protection with either 100% price election or revenue protection. The farmer will claim PP
if
(3-5)

u(πpp ) > EU(π
̃LP ),

where u(∙) is a strictly increasing twice-continuously differentiable farmer’s utility function
and EU(∙) is the expected utility function. Conditional on the information known to the
farmer at t = 1, expected utility can be rewritten as
(3-6)

EU(π
̃LP ) = u(E(π
̃LP ) − RPM),

where E(π
̃LP ) is the farmer’s expected value of π
̃ LP , and RPM is the risk premium
assuming s/he is a risk averter (Chavas 2004, p.36). In other words, the farmer chooses
PP when πpp > E(π
̃LP ) − RPM and indifferent when
(3-7)

πpp = E(π
̃LP ) − RPM.
Equation (3-7) can be interpreted as a PP-LP indifference curve (PP-LP curve).

The PP-LP curve depicts the combinations of E(p̃) and E(q̃) that satisfy equation (3-7) or
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(3-8)

πpp = E[(p̃q̃ − c1 − m − c2 ) + max{0, indj }] − RPM
= E(p̃)E(q̃) + cov(p̃, q̃) − c1 − m − c2 + max{0, indj } − RPM, j = yp, rp.

In the case of yield protection, equation (3-8) can be rewritten as
(3-9)

πpp = E(p̃)E(q̃) + cov(p̃, q̃) − c1 − m − c2 + pg ∙ max{0, ρθqAPH − E(q̃)}) − RPM.

If ρθqAPH < E(q̃), or guaranteed yield < expected yield, then the expected indemnity = 0.
Equation (3-9) then becomes
(3-10) E(p̃)E(q̃) = πpp − cov(p̃, q̃) + c1 + m + c2 + RPM
1

⇒ E(q̃) = E(p̃) (πpp − cov(p̃, q̃) + c1 + m + c2 + RPM).
If ρθqAPH > E(q̃), or guaranteed yield > expected yield, then the expected indemnity =
pg (ρθqAPH − E(q̃)). Equation (3-9) then becomes
(3-11) (E(p̃) − pg )E(q̃) = πpp − cov(p̃, q̃) + c1 + m + c2 − pg ρθqAPH + RPM
1

⇒ E(q̃) = E(p̃)−p (πpp − cov(p̃, q̃) + c1 + m + c2 − pg ρθqAPH + RPM).
g

In either case, the PP-LP curve is convex toward origin in the q-p plane (hyperbola) as
shown in Figure 3-2. Above ρθqAPH , i.e., guaranteed yield, the PP-LP curve follows
equation (3-10) and below ρθqAPH , the PP-LP curve follows equation (3-11) which is flatter
than the curve equation (3-10).
Note that the expectation operator in equations (3-7) to (3-11) is not necessarily
the expected value of a random variable (price and yield). It is more or less like
anticipated values from the farmer with information at t = 1. For example, suppose that
the farmer’s expectation (anticipation) of price and yield based on information known to
her/him at t = 1 is (E(p̃1 ), E(q̃1 )). If the combination of the expected price and yield lies

30

above the PP-LP curve, the farmer would choose LP, otherwise s/he would choose PP.
In Figure 3-2 (E(p̃1 ), E(q̃1 )) lies on the curve and the farmer is indifferent.

Figure 3-2. PP-LP curve for yield protection

In the case of revenue protection, the farmer is indifferent between PP and LP
when
(3-12) πpp = E(p̃)E(q̃) + cov(p̃, q̃) − c1 − m − c2
+ max {0, min (2pg , max (pg , E(p̃))) ∙ ρθqAPH − E(p̃)E(q̃)} − RPM.
If min (2pg , max (pg , E(p̃))) ∙ ρθqAPH < E(p̃)E(q̃) , i.e., guaranteed revenue < expected
revenue, the expected revenue protection indemnity is zero then the PP-LP curve in
equation (3-8) becomes
1

(3-13) E(q̃) = E(p̃) (πpp − cov(p̃, q̃) + c1 + m + c2 + RPM).
Equation (3-13) is similar to equation (3-10), the PP-LP curve for yield protection.
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If instead min(2pg , max (pg , E(p̃))) ∙ ρθqAPH > E(p̃)E(q̃), i.e., guaranteed revenue
> expected revenue, the farmer expects to receive the RP indemnity. When pg < E(p̃) <
2pg , i.e. the price at t = 2 is anticipated to be higher than the elected price but less than
2pg , the farmer’s expected indemnity would be E(p̃)ρθqAPH − E(p̃)E(q̃). Note that the
condition to receive the revenue indemnity, i.e., ρθqAPH > E(q̃), must hold. In other words,
farmer’s expected yield must be lower than guaranteed yield, otherwise there is no
revenue protection indemnity. In this case, the PP-LP curve becomes
(3-14) πpp = E(p̃)E(q̃) + cov(p̃, q̃) − c1 − m − c2 + E(p̃)ρθqAPH − E(p̃)E(q̃) − RPM
1

⇒ E(p̃) = ρθq

APH

(πpp − cov(p̃, q̃) + c1 + m + c2 + RPM)

Equation (3-14) tells us that E(p̃) is now a fixed value because all of parameters in the
right hand side are known to the farmer at t = 1 (vertical line from E(p̃) axis in Figure 3-3).
The expected indemnity is 2pg ρθqAPH − E(p̃)E(q̃) when E(p̃) > 2pg , i.e. the
anticipated price at t = 2 is higher than twice of the elected price. In this case,
2pg ρθqAPH > E(p̃)E(q̃) to receive the RP indemnity. Both terms E(p̃) and E(q̃) disappear
from equation (3-12) and the PP-LP line is not defined. However, the farmer will most likely
choose LP because the anticipated price is very high. The combination (E(p̃), E(q̃)) will
be then located on the right hand side of the vertical line in Figure 3-3.
When E(p̃) < pg , i.e. the price at t = 2 is expected to falls below the elected price,
the expected indemnity is pg ρθqAPH − E(p̃)E(q̃). Again, pg ρθqAPH > E(p̃)E(q̃) to satisfy
the condition of receiving RP indemnity. Note that pg ρθqAPH is represented by a grey
rectangular in Figure 3-3 and the expected revenue should be smaller than the size of the
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rectangular. It implies that the farmer would choose PP in this case even though the PPLP line is not defined because both terms E(p̃) and E(q̃) disappear from equation (3-12).

Figure 3-3. PP-LP curve for revenue protection

Once the PP-LP curve is constructed, the change in the probability of choosing PP
given different insurance coverage rates can be computed as
(3-15) ∆ Pr(PP) = Pr(PP|θ1 ) − Pr(PP|θ0 ),
where, Pr(PP) is the probability of choosing PP and θ0 and θ1 represent any two coverage
levels, θ0 , θ1 ϵ[50%, x]. If ∆ Pr(PP) > 0 , when θ1 > θ0 , then, the probability of (ex-post)
moral hazard increases. Or, simply, the PP-LP curve with higher coverage lies above the
PP-LP curve with lower insurance coverage.
3.5. Representative Farmer and Stochastic Simulation
In this section, stochastic simulation of a representative farmer is developed in order
to derive numerical PP-LP curves that will show how moral hazard is affected by changes
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in θ in PP decision making. Our simulation of a representative farmer’s behavior on crop
insurance is not original to this paper. Babcock and Hennessy (1996) and Coble, Heifner,
and Zuniga (2000) have previously created a representative farmer.
3.5.1. Representative Farmer
A representative farmer is modeled based on corn budget data from Hamilton
County, Iowa to generate the PP-LP curves. For this simulation, historical corn price and
yield, insurance premium including subsidy over insurance plans, and farm cost data are
compiled from Iowa extension, the RMA quick cost estimator, and USDA NASS (Table 31). There are be 48 different crop insurance plans from two different insurance types, RP
and YP, three different PP coverages,θpp , (60%, 65%, and 70%), and eight different
insurance coverages,θ, (50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85%). To make the
comparisons simple, a subset of six crop insurance plans is presented (Simulation have
been done for all of the possible crop insurance plans). Table 3-1 presents information for
the representative farmer.
3.5.2. Risk Premium
Risk premium is defined as a certain amount of money that farmer is willing to pay to avoid
the risk. Thus, risk premium is intuitively interpreted as the shadow cost of private risk
bearing (Chavas 2004). Certainty equivalent means the difference between the expected
monetary value of the alternative (here, LP profit) and risk premium.
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Table 3-1. Representative Corn Farmer in Hamilton County, Iowa
Yield Protection

Revenue Protection

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

PP coverage level (θpp )

60%

65%

70%

60%

65%

70%

Coverage level (θ)

65%

75%

85%

65%

75%

85%

LP reduction factor ( ρ)

0.95

Elected price1 (pg )

$4.62/bushel

Volatility of corn price2
APH3

0.19

(qAPH )

189 bushels/acre

Avg. yield

179.52 bushels/acre

St. Dev. of yield

35.42 bushels/acre

Insurance premium ($/acre) (m)
Coverage subsidy rate4
Additional premium for buy-up PP

($/acre)5

7

11

17

10

19

37

0.59

0.55

0.38

0.59

0.55

0.38

0

0.22

0.85

0

0.22

0.85

$26.71

$21.20

Cost at t=1 ($/acre), (c1 )

$327.8/acre

Cost of planting cover crop (ccv )

$38/acre

Cost of LP at time period 2 (c2 )

$424.08/acre

Correlation between price and yield 6

-0.30

yield 7

-$9.05

Covariance between price and
Utility

u(π) = −exp(−rπ)

function8

Risk aversion

parameter9

Risk Premium,
1

RPM10

(r)

0.002
$32.83

$30.47

$27.35

$31.09

The elected corn price is $4.62/bushel in 2014 and is considered an average price.
corn futures price data from the RMA.
3 Trend-adjusted APH.
4 The farmer is responsible for (1 – coverage subsidy rate)×insurance premium. Federal
government pays subsidy rate × insurance premium.
5 For example, a farmer in Hamilton County should pay $17+$0.85 to purchase buy-up 10% PP
(70% coverage) with 85% coverage level (case 3). Buy-up PP premiums differ by county.
6 For numerical simulation, corn price and yield are generated randomly in consideration of
correlation between price and yield. The correlation is calculated using historical data from 1990 to
2005.
7 Covariance between historical corn price and yield.
8 Negative exponential utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), which is
given by r. This function has been used extensively in decision analysis (Hardaker et al. 2004,
p.103).
9 When r = 0, the decision maker is risk neutral and higher values of r imply risk averse decision
makers. We select r = 0.002 based on Table 2 in Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman (1993). The risk
aversion coefficient of 0.002 is relatively risk averse farmer.
10 RPM is calculated using given the utility function and risk aversion coefficient.
2 Historical
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The risk premium,RPM, in Table 3-1 is derived assuming a negative exponential
utility function, as follows
1. Generate random corn price and yield, p̃ and q̃, at the harvesting time, t = 2.
2. Calculate profit from late planting, π
̃LP .
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for 1000 times.
4. Calculate the certainty equivalent (CE) using simulated profit from step 3 using the
formula, CE(r) =

1
ln[(1000 ∑ exp(−r ∙

−

1
r

πi )) ], where i represents each iteration and

r stands for the absolute risk aversion coefficient (Hardarker et al. 2004, p. 257).
5. Derive the risk premium following the definition, RPM = E(π
̃LP ) − u−1 (EU(π
̃LP ))
(Chavas 2004, p. 34) which is equivalent to RPM = E(π
̃LP ) − CE(r).
3.5.3. PP-LP Curve
The PP-LP curves are then derived as follows
1. Generate random corn price and yield, E(p̃) and E(q̃), at the harvesting time t = 2.
2. Calculate profit in equation (3-2) with insurance indemnity if any using equations
(3-3) and (3-4).
3. Using equation (3-5), the farmer decides what to do, i.e., PP or LP.
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 for 50,000 times.
5. Plot the combination of E(p̃) and E(q̃) in red if the farmer chooses PP, otherwise
in blue.

Figure 3-4 presents the PP-LP curves from the simulation for the farmer who is
relatively risk averse, r = 0.002. As expected from Figures 3-2 and 3-3, the PP-LP curves
are negatively sloped and convex towards the origin.
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Figure 3-4. PP-LP curve from stochastic simulation
Note: Legend example: RP_65_75 = revenue protection with 65% buy-up PP and 75% insurance
coverage and YP_65_75 = yield protection with 65% PP and 75% insurance coverage.
Red area = PP region and blue area = LP region.

Figures 3-5 presents the PP-LP curves for cases of yield protection (cases 1, 2,
and 3 in Table 3-1) and revenue protection (cases 4, 5 and 6 in Table 3-1) to compare the
effects of different crop insurance coverage levels on the and PP-LP decision. The PP-LP
curves for revenue protection are truncated where the expected yield is relatively low and
the expected price is relatively high. This is because a farmer can be protected when yield
declines as well as price declines. For higher coverage levels, the likelihood of claiming
PP becomes larger which represents an increase in moral hazard, i.e., ∆ Pr(PP) =
∆(PP|high θ) − ∆(PP|low θ) > 0. Differing with Rejesus et al. (2003), revenue protection
has a smaller probability of claiming PP than yield protection (Figure 3-6). To identify how
sensitive to the level of risk aversion coefficient, PP_LP curves for different risk aversion
coefficients are compared (Figure 3-7). The Figure 3-7 indicates PP_LP curves with higher
risk aversion coefficient shift proportionally to the right. It means that farmer with more risk
averse preference is likely to claim PP more.
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Figure 3-5. PP-LP curves over different types and coverages of crop insurance
Note: Legend example: RP_60_65 = revenue protection with 60% PP and 65% insurance coverage
and YP_70_85 = yield protection with 70 buy-up PP and 85% insurance coverage.

Panel A. Case 1

Panel B. Case 2

Panel C. Case 3

Figure 3-6. Comparison of PP-LP curves for revenue protection and yield protection
Note: Legend example: RP_60_65 = revenue protection with 60% PP and 65% insurance coverage
and YP_70_85 = yield protection with 70 buy-up PP and 85% insurance coverage.
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Panel A. Case 1

Panel B. Case 2

Figure 3-7. Comparison of PP-LP curves for different risk aversion parameters
Note: Legend example: RP_60_65_1=revenue protection with 60% PP an 65% insurance coverage
with risk aversion coefficient 0.002, RP_60_65_2= revenue protection with 60% PP an 65%
insurance coverage with risk aversion coefficient 0.004 and YP_60_65_1=revenue protection with
60% PP an 65% insurance coverage with risk aversion coefficient 0.002, YP_60_65_2=revenue
protection with 60% PP an 65% insurance coverage with risk aversion coefficient 0.004.

3.6. Spatial Econometric Model
3.6.1. Basic Model
As shown in Figures 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6 the PP-LP curves are a function of crop
insurance coverage level, types of coverage, expected price, and expected yield. To
estimate the statistical relationship between the PP ratio and crop insurance coverage
level, the following regression model is expressed
(3-16)

yit = β0 + ∑K
k=1 xitk βk + εit ,

where yit is the ratio of PP claims to number of earning premium policies in county i at
time t, xitk is the kth explanatory variable including the insurance coverage level, expected
price and expected yield in county i at time t, and other control variables as explained in
the following section.
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3.6.2. Spatial Model
Equation (3-16) might be spatially correlated since data are collected at the county
level. It is plausible that the PP claims in county i may affect the PP claims in a neighboring
county and vice versa. Omitting a spatial lag of PP claims in the regression model may
cause omitted variable bias (LeSage and Pace 2009). To control for the spatial correlation,
equation (3-16) is therefore converted to
(3-17)

K
yit = β0 + ρ ∑N
j=1 wij yjt + ∑k=1 xitk βk + εit → 𝐲 = ρ𝐖𝐲 + 𝐗𝛃 + 𝛆,

where yit is the PP ratio in county i, yjt is the PP ratio of a neighboring county j, and wij
is the spatial weight between county i and j. The coefficient ρ is the spatial correlation
coefficient, xikt is the kth explanatory variable, such as insurance coverage level, lagged
corn yield and price, and the (absolute value of) PDSIs. The error term, εit , also spatially
correlated such that εit = μi + λ ∑N
j=1 wij εjt + uit , where λ is the spatial (error) correlation,
and uit is a white noise error term. Parameters 𝛃′ s, ρ, and λ are estimated. In addition,
equation (3-17) can be rewritten such that
(3-18)

𝐲 = (𝐈 − ρ𝐖)−1 𝐗𝛃 + (𝐈 − ρ𝐖)−1 𝛆,

where 𝐖 is a spatial weighting matrix, 𝐖 = [wij ]. Naturally, it is important to construct the
weighting matrix 𝐖 in spatial econometrics since the spatial econometrics renders direct
impact and indirect impact through spatial weighting matrix (LeSage and Pace 2009).
3.6.3. Estimation
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used to estimate the parameters in
equation (3-17). Fixed effects models are estimated in order to control for an unobserved
time invariant effect. Random effects model assume the unobserved time invariant
components are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2010, p. 286),

40

otherwise parameter estimates are inconsistent. In this research, random effects models
are not considered because unobserved time invariant components, for example, soil
quality are clearly correlated with explanatory variables, for example, insurance coverage
level and PP ratio, in equation (3-17).
Fixed effect models, however, suffer from the “incidental parameter problem” when
MLE is used, i.e., estimates are inconsistent (Neyman and Scott 1948; Lancaster 2000).
Inconsistency of parameters occurs because the number of parameters increases when
the cross-sectional units, N, becomes large relative to the time dimension, T. To overcome
this problem, Lee and Yu (2010) propose using the Helmert transformation procedure.
The Helmert transformation (Arellano and Bover 1995) transforms data as follows. First
define
1

ỹit = T−t ∑Tm=t+1 yim ,

(3-19)

where ỹit represents the mean obtained from the future values of yit , where T denotes the
last time period of data. Then the Helmert transformed data are
T−t

ŷit = √T−t+1 (yit − ỹit ).

(3-20)

All explanatory variables and error terms are transformed in the same fashion. Thus
equation (3-17) becomes
ŷit = β0 + ρ ∑N
̂ jt + ∑K
̂ itk βk + ε̂it .
j=1 wij y
k=1 x

(3-21)

3.6.4. Data
Data are collected from various sources. Crop insurance data, such as number of
policies and number of PP claims, are compiled from the Summary of Business Reports
and Data (http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html) and the Summary of Business with
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Month of Loss (http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/cause.html) both provided by the RMA.
County-level corn yield and corn price data are collected from the USDA NASS database.
The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) (http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/climdiv/climdiv-pdsidvv1.0.0-20160204) is also used to control for potentially unexpected yield change.
A total of 594 counties located in the Corn-Belt8 states are included in the analysis.
Table 3-2 contains the summary statistics of these variables from 2000-2013. Note that
data for the year 2010 are dropped from the analysis due to their unreliability. Note that
reported PP ratios are greater than 1 even 10 in many counties in year 2010. By definition
of the PP ratio, this is impossible. In addition, some counties are dropped from the dataset
since they do not have crop insurance data and/or no corn was planted during some years.

Table 3-2. Summary Statistics (2000 – 2013)a
Variables

Mean

St.Dev

Min

Max

PP ratio (yit )

4.97%

14.59%

0%

100%

Insurance coverage (Covg it )

67.85%

6.31%

50%

83.89%

(Lagged) Corn Yield (bushel/acre)

142.86

29.71

19

211.5

(Lagged) Corn Price ($/bushel)

3.47

1.60

1.65

7.34

Absolute PDSI in April

1.95

1.31

0

7.42

Absolute PDSI in May

1.99

1.28

0

7.62

Absolute PDSI in June

1.96

1.37

0

7.9

a

2010 data are dropped because data for 2010 from the Summary of Business with Month of Loss
is unreliable. Many counties reported the PP ratio being greater than 1 even 10. By definition of the
PP ratio, it is impossible.
b PDSI = Palmer Drought Severity Index. A higher PDSI value implies severe adverse events, such
as drought or excess moisture, which prevent the planting of corn during planting season. PDSI is
close to zero for a normal season.

8

IL, IN, IA, KY, MI, MN, MO, OH, and WI.
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The average PP ratio is 4.97% from 2000-2013. The standard deviation of the PP
ratio is computed to be 14.59%, which shows that the PP ratio has varied substantially
across counties and over time. This is possibly because of the adverse events occurring
at planting time over a wide range of regions simultaneously. The variable Covg it is a
weighted average of insurance coverage levels using insured acres, i.e., Covg it =

∑k ck Ak
,
∑k Ak

where k = type of insurance coverage, ck = coverage from 50% to 85%, and Ak = insured
acres under kth type of crop insurance. The average of insurance coverage rate is
estimated to be 69.85% with a standard deviation 6.31%. Minimum coverage level is 50%,
while the maximum coverage level is 84%.
As in equation (3-16), the anticipated corn yield and price in planting season may
affect the level of PP claims. As shown in Figures 3-4 and 3-5, a farmer may not claim the
PP when s/he anticipates the high corn yield and price at the harvesting time.
Unfortunately, these two variables are not observed directly. Lagged corn yield and prices
are used as proxy variables for the anticipated corn yield and price. The average of lagged
corn yield is 142.86 bushels/acre with an average price of $3.47/bushel (Table 3-2).
A PP claim depends heavily on the weather at planting time. The PDSI9 for April,
May, and June are included in the analysis to control weather variations especially drought
or excess soil moisture. A negative PDSI represents the (severity of) drought and positive
PDSI indicates (severe) excess soil moisture. Both drought and excess soil moisture
adversely impact corn growth. Following Chen and Miranda (2007), the absolute value of

9

The PDSI is a measurement of dryness based on recent precipitation and temperature. The PDSI
is an effective measure determining long-term drought. A PDSI of 0 is normal, and the negative
PDSI indicates drought. For example, -2 considered moderate drought, -3 indicates severe drought,
and -4 of extreme drought. A positive PDSI indicates the excess moisture. For example, +2
indicates moderate wetness, +3 severe wetness, and +4 is extreme wetness (Alley 1984).
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the PDSI is used as our explanatory variable. A higher PDSI value indicates the severity
of adverse events faced by farmers. The average of absolute values of PDSI is given by
1.82 ~ 1.97 in the planting season. The average of actual PDSI is estimated to be 0.58 ~
0.81 which is close to normal.
3.6.5. Weighting Matrix
There are various ways to build a weighting matrix, 𝐖 = [wij ], such as queen
contiguity, rook contiguity, and inverse-distance (Drukker, Peng, and Pruncha 2013). The
queen contiguity method assigns a non-zero spatial weight when a county shares borders
with neighboring counties as defined in equation (3-22):
(3-22)

1 if boundary i ∩ boundary j ≠ ∅
wij = {
for ∀i ≠ j and wii = 0 for ∀ i.
0 if boundary i ∩ boundary j = ∅

If county i and j share at least one boundary (common border), the element of the
weighting matrix, wij , takes 1, otherwise 0. County i is given a 0 weight for itself. In other
words, counties are not considered neighbors to themselves. The rook contiguity is similar
to queen contiguity but is more restrictive contiguity than queen. The rook contiguity
assigns a non-zero weight when a county shares a certain portion of boundary with
neighboring counties.
An inverse distance spatial weighting matrix is constructed by weights inversely
related to the distances among counties. The inverse distance method assigns a non-zero
spatial weight as follows

(3-23)

1
dij

wij = {

̅
if dij < d

̅
0 if dij > d

for ∀i ≠ j and wii = 0 for ∀ i,
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̅ indicates a predetermined
where dij is the distance between county i and j and d
threshold (66.4 miles in this study), which makes all the counties in the dataset have at
least one neighbor. By dropping some observations (explained in data section) there
exists five counties isolated.
For the purpose of forming a spatial lag, the matrix 𝐖 can be normalized to avoid
a singularity of un-normalized spatial weighting matrix (LeSage and Pace 2009; Kelejian
and Prucha 2010). There are various ways to normalize 𝐖 such as row-sum, minimax,
and spectral normalization (Drukker, Peng, and Prucha 2013). The row-sum method
divides each element in 𝐖 by its corresponding row-sum, i.e., w
̃ ij = wij /ri , where ri is the
sum of the ith row of 𝐖. However, the normalized weighting matrix under this method is
asymmetric and this property needs a justification of asymmetry (Kelejian and Prucha
2010). To make 𝐖 symmetric, the minimax or spectral method can be used. The (i, j)th
̃ is defined such that w
element of normalized minimax weighting matrix, 𝐖
̃ ij = wij /m and
m = min{max(ri ) , max(ci )}, where ri is the sum of the ith row and ci is the sum of ith
column (Drukker, Peng, and Prucha 2013). The (i, j)th element of normalized spectral
̃ is defined such that w
weighting matrix, 𝐖
̃ ij = wij /v, where v is the largest of the moduli
of the eigenvalues of un-normalized weighting matrix 𝐖 (Drukker, Peng and Prucha 2013).
In this research, the spectral normalization method is used since there is no reason to
impose different weights across counties. The user-written command spmat in Stata
(Drukker, Peng, and Prucha 2013) is used to build and normalize the weighting matrix. A
total of 594 counties for 13 years are included in the dataset, and the size of the
corresponding 𝐖 matrix is (594 counties x 13 years) x (594 counties x 13 years), which is
a block diagonal.
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3.6.6. Results and Discussion
Table 3-3 contains the estimation results of equation (3-17) with four different
specifications, i) fixed effect model (ρ = 0 and λ = 0), ii) spatial error model (SEM) (ρ = 0
and λ ≠ 0), iii) spatial autoregressive model (SAR) ( ρ ≠ 0 and λ = 0, and iv) spatial
autocorrelation model (SAC) (ρ ≠ 0 and λ ≠ 0).

Table 3-3. Estimation Results with Four Spatial Specificationsa
PP ratio (%)
Covg
Yield(-1)
Price(-1)
Apr PDSI
May PDSI
Jun PDSI
Constantb

(1)
OLS
0.304***
(0.055)
-0.039***
(0.006)
-0.942***
(0.160)
-0.661***
(0.186)
2.288***
(0.195)
0.854***
(0.145)
-12.543***
(3.500)

Lambda

(2)
SEM
0.195***
(0.073)
-0.012
(0.009)
-1.100***
(0.368)
0.230
(0.308)
1.740***
(0.348)
0.869***
(0.306)

(4)
SAC
0.189***
(0.063)
-0.016**
(0.008)
-0.806***
(0.236)
-0.053
(0.232)
1.405***
(0.256)
0.759***
(0.204)

0.932***
(0.018)
7128
52487.0

0.701***
(0.030)
0.634***
(0.034)
7128
52160.1

1.165***
(0.005)

Rho
Nc
BIC

(3)
SAR
0.160***
(0.045)
-0.016***
(0.005)
-0.583***
(0.133)
-0.127
(0.148)
0.908***
(0.166)
0.570***
(0.113)

7722
58597.1

7128
52319.9

Note: Numbers in parentheses are cluster robust standard errors; Significance levels are 1% (***),
5% (**), and 10% (*).
a All the models are fixed effect models, i.e., y − y
̅ i∙ = β0 + β(xit − x̅i∙ ) + (εit − ε̅i∙ ), to control for the
it
unobserved time invariant effect.
b Spatial models do not have constant terms because of Helmert transformation
c Spatial models have less observations because of Helmert transformation
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The relationship between the PP ratio and insurance coverage level is positive and
statistically significant in all four models, with magnitudes between 0.160 ~ 0.304, which
is consistent with the theory and simulation results presented in the previous sections. If
a farmer purchases the higher coverage, s/he would claim PP more when experiencing
adverse events such as drought or excessive moisture. However, when controlling for
spatial lag, the magnitude of coverage level of OLS is higher than other spatial models.
Thus, OLS result implies there may exist for upward biasedness for coverage level due to
omission of spatial lag of PP ratio. Lagged price (our proxy for the expected price) has a
negative effect on the PP ratio as expected. If the farmer anticipates a higher price at a
harvest, s/he would be more likely to plant corn (late planting) instead of claiming PP. In
spatial models, the values of ρ and 𝜆 are positive and statistically significant, which implies
that PP ratios and error terms are spatially correlated across counties.
3.7. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This study examines the existence of moral hazard in the choices of prevented
planting (PP) and late planting (LP). The PP provision is defined as the “failure to plant an
insured crop by the final planting date due to adverse events”, such as excess soil
moisture or drought. If a farmer decides not to plant a crop, the farmer receives a PP
indemnity. LP is an option for the farmer to plant the crop and still maintain the crop
insurance when s/he fails to plant a crop by the final planting date. However, by choosing
LP option the farmer has to lower the insurance coverage level depending on the LP date
due to potential yield loss.
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Crop insurance may alter a farmer’s production choice between PP and LP. In
other words, crop insurance can increase the likelihood of PP claims even though farmers
can still choose LP. This paper seeks to find evidence that the farmer with higher insurance
coverage tends to choose PP more often, which suggests an increase in moral hazard.
Assuming a relatively risk averse farmer, we derive a PP-LP curve representing
the farmer’s indifference between PP and LP. As shown in Figures 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6, the
PP-LP curve is convex to the origin in the expected yield and price plane. These figures
demonstrate that a farmer chooses LP when s/he expects a higher crop price and yield at
harvest time. Two important findings from the stochastic simulation are i) farmers with
higher insurance coverage are more likely to choose PP more, and ii) all else equal,
farmers with revenue protection, as opposed to yield protection, are less likely to claim PP
which differs from the findings of Rejesus et al. (2003).
Empirical research is conducted to estimate the statistical relationship between the
PP ratio, on the one hand, and insurance coverage level and anticipated price on the
other. Spatial fixed effect models are estimated to control for unobserved time invariant
effects and spatial correlation among neighboring counties. Estimation results indicate that
the PP ratio has a positive relationship with insurance coverage levels and a negative
relationship with anticipated price. These empirical results correspond to a stochastic
simulation results.
Results presented in this study carry important implications for crop insurance.
Existing (ex-post) moral hazard in PP claim should be mitigated so as not to discourage
farmers from planting a crop. Abandoning cropland (in a given year) leads to a
contradiction with USDA’s goal of promoting agricultural production to improve food
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security (USDA’s strategic Plan FY 2010-2015, Goal 3) (OIG 2013). Exploring how best
to mitigate moral hazard in the PP provision is an area for future study.
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4. PREVENTED PLANTING AND PLANTING SECOND CROP
Abstract
If a farmer chooses prevented planting (PP), s/he receives the PP indemnity and
may either leave the acreage unplanted or plant a second crop, e.g., soybean for corn. If
the farmer chooses to plant a second crop after prevented from planting a first crop, s/he
receives a reduced PP payment (35% of PP indemnity) and s/he is assigned to 60% of
the approved yield of the first crop in the APH for the next crop year. The current PP
provision fails to provide farmers with an incentive to plant a second crop (99.9% of PP
claiming farmers do not plant the second crop). Adjusting reduced PP indemnity payment
may encourage farmers to plant a second crop, which is currently fixed at 35% of the total
PP indemnity. The objective in this second study is to estimate the optimal PP payment
percentage that may better encourage farmers to plant a second crop, which would help
achieve a goal of USDA to better promote agricultural production. Using corn-soybean
budget data from Hamilton County, Iowa, a representative farmer is depicted. We show
through stochastic simulation, that under the current PP reduction factor, the farmer is
unlikely to plant a second crop. However, if a reduction factor increases, the farmer
becomes more likely to do so. This study finds that the optimal reduced PP payment
percentage is greater than the existing 35%.

Key Words: Crop Insurance Prevented Planting, Second Crop, Expected Utility Theory
JEL Codes: D81, G22, Q18
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4.1. Introduction
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) has included prevented planting (PP) in its
crop insurance program since 1998. PP is defined as the “failure to plant an insured crop
by the final planting date, or within any applicable late planting (LP) period due to adverse
events”, such as excess soil moisture or drought (2013 Crop Insurance Handbook, USDARMA 2013). If a farmer with a base PP coverage level (base PP) claims PP payments,
60% (varies from 25% to 60% depending on crops insured) of the original liability is paid
as an indemnity on approval of the insurer. The farmer also can choose to buy-up his or
her PP coverage level by 5% or 10%. In this case, PP payments are given at 65% and
70% of the original liability, respectively.
PP payments currently accounted for the large shares of total indemnity in crop
insurance programs. PP payments accounted for roughly 9% of total indemnity payments
from 1998 to 2008. From 2009 to 2013, PP payments accounted for roughly 17% of total
indemnity, on average. In 2010 alone, the share of PP payments increased to
approximately 29% of total indemnity (author’s calculation from Indemnities with Month of
Loss in the RMA Cause of Loss, http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/cause.html).
Late planting (LP) is another option that a farmer may take when s/he fails to plant
a (first) crop during the normal planting period. However, by choosing LP, the farmer does
not receive a full PP indemnity. The coverage level is lowered based on LP date due to
estimated yield loss (1% per day after final planting date). As evidenced by the recent
increase in PP payments, farmers tend to choose PP in lieu of LP. Rejesus et al. (2003)
and Rejesus, Escalante, and Lovell (2005) show that crop insurance provides farmers with
an incentive to choose PP. Kim and Kim (2015) also find that farmers with higher insurance
coverage are more likely to claim PP than LP.
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Second crop (SC) is the choice of planting a second crop, e.g., soybeans for corn
after the LP period and having declared PP. When a farmer chooses to plant a second
crop s/he receives 35% of the PP indemnity (2013 Crop Insurance Handbook, USDARMA 2013) and is assigned to 60% of the approved yield of the first crop in the Actual
Production History (APH) for the next crop year. Figure 1 briefly explains the timeline of
PP, LP, and SC options.

Figure 4-1. Timeline for choice between prevented planting and late planting
Note: PP = prevented planting, LP = late planting, CV = cover crop, SC = second crop.
Dates are for a typical farm in Iowa. Text which is not the subject of this section is greyed out.

In 2013, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) audited the RMA’s PP provisions.
The OIG found that “producer’s currently plant only 0.1 percent of prevented planting acres
to a second crop.” (OIG 2013, p. 8). This implies the current PP provision discourages
farmers from planting a second crop. Abandoning this cropland in a given year leads to
two problems. First, insurance premium subsidies paid to farmers are, in effect, wasted
because no crop is produced. Second, it is a contradiction of the USDA’s goal of promoting
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agricultural production to improve food security (USDA’s strategic Plan FY 2010-2015,
Goal 3) (OIG 2013).
The OIG (2013) points out that the incentive not to plant a second crop is caused
by the design of the PP provision, which assigns 60% of the approved yield of the first
crop in the APH calculation for the next crop year. Compared to 1995-1997, when the APH
adjustment was not included in the PP provision, the ratio between acres planted to a
second crop and the total PP claim acres was about 36%. In 2008-2011, when the RMA
included the APH adjustment in the PP provision, this ratio was only 0.1%. The OIG (2013)
recommended to the RMA “to determine whether an assignment of yield to all PP acres
is not prohibited…” (OIG 2013, p. 10). Following the OGC’s recommendation, the RMA
agreed to assess whether the APH adjustment is appropriate. However, “the RMA doesn’t
anticipate this to be the likely outcome.” (OIG 2013, p.11)
In addition to modifying the APH calculation, adjusting the PP indemnity payment
which is currently fixed at 35% of the total PP indemnity may also encourage farmers to
plant a second crop. The main objective of this study is to estimate the appropriate
percentage reduction in PP payments for farmers who choose to plant a second crop. A
conceptual model to characterize the farmer’s choice is developed. An analytical solution
of the percentage of PP payment may not be easily derived due to the complexity of
decision making process on PP and SC. Instead, a stochastic simulation is conducted to
estimate the proper percentage reduction. Specifically, the objective in this paper is to
discover what percentage reduction in PP payment induces farmers to plant a second
crop when they fail to plant the first crop and claim PP.
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4.2. Literature Review
Few academic studies exist concerning PP. Rejesus et al. (2003) analyze potential
fraudulence of PP claims. They show empirically that a higher insurance coverage level
induces more fraudulent PP claims. Also, they find that revenue protection leads to more
fraudulent PP claims than yield protection. Rejesus, Escalante, and Lovell (2005) also
analyze the relationship between PP claims and land ownership and farm business
structure. They find that tenant status under a leasing contract increases the likelihood of
claiming PP. They also show that sole ownership and partnership farms claim more PP
than cooperate farms. Kim and Kim (2015) examine the existence of moral hazard
inherent in the choices of PP and late planting and show that a farmer with higher
insurance coverage may tend to choose PP more often.
To the best of author’s knowledge, regarding a choice of second crop, there are
no academic studies except some University extension reports to introduce and explain
second crop provision, e.g., Schnitkey (2013) and Edwards (2014).
4.3. Conceptual Model
Assume that a farmer is risk averse and maximizes expected utility from uncertain
profit at harvest time. Suppose that, due to adverse events such as drought or excess soil
moisture at planting time, the farmer must choose PP or SC. The farmer is at the final
“late” planting time (See Figure 4-1), time period 1 (t = 1), and must make a decision. If
the farmer decides to claim PP, s/he obtains the profit from the PP indemnity, πPP , with
certainty, where
(4-1)

fc
fc
fc
πPP = pfc
g θpp θq APH − c1 − m − ccv ,
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where the superscript fc indicates a first crop, e.g., corn, pfc
g is the elected (guaranteed)
price of the first crop, θpp is the PP coverage level (60%, 65% or 70% depending on buyup), and θ is the insurance coverage level and θ ∈ [50%, x] with an increase in 5% and x
fc
varies from 75% to 85% over crops and regions. qfc
APH is the APH for the first crop. c1 is

input cost per acre for the normal planting, mfc is the crop insurance premium for the first
crop, and ccv is the cost for planting the cover crop which is a requirement of PP claim.
Suppose that a farmer ultimately chooses to plant a second crop, e.g., soybean,
after declaring PP, then the farmer receives:
(4-2)

π
̃sc = α ∙ indfc
̃ sc ,
pp + nr

where indfc
pp represents the PP indemnity for the first crop, and α = 0.35, i.e., the farmer
receives 35% of the total PP indemnity when s/he chooses to plant a second crop. The
term nr
̃ sc is the net return from the second crop at the harvest time. The net return from
the second crop in equation (4-2) is defined in equation (4-3), which depends on whether
crop insurance is purchased for the second crop:
(4-3)

nr
̃ sc = p̃sc q̃sc − c1fc − mfc − c2sc − msc + max(0, indsc
j ) crop insurance purchased,
nr
̃ sc = p̃sc q̃sc − c1fc − mfc − c2sc

crop insurance not purchased,

where p̃sc is the market price of the second crop at harvest time, which is stochastic at t =
1, q̃sc is the yield of the second crop at the end of the season, which is also stochastic, c1fc
indicates the cost of planting the first crop, mfc is the insurance premium for the first crop,
c2sc represents the cost of planting, cultivating and harvesting the second crop at t = 2, msc
is the insurance premium for the second crop, and indsc
j (j = yp, rp) is the insurance
indemnity for the second crop, where yp represents the yield protection and rp represents
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the revenue protection. Note that tilde above the variable indicates that the corresponding
variable is stochastic to farmers at t = 1.
The insurance indemnity indsc
j depends on the type of crop insurance chosen. In
the case of yield protection, indsc
yp , is given by
sc
sc
(4-4) indsc
̃ sc },
yp = pg max{0, ρθq APH − q

where, psc
g is the elected (guaranteed) price of a second crop, ρ is the coverage reduction
factor depending on the second crop’s planting date10 (roughly 0.89), θ is the coverage
level for the second crop, qsc
̃ sc is the anticipated yield of
APH is a second crop APH, and q
the second crop at t = 2. If the anticipated yield is higher than the production associated
with coverage level ρθqsc
APH , the farmer does not receive the yield protection indemnity,
regardless of the actual price level at harvest time.
In the case of revenue protection, the anticipated indemnity, indsc
rp , becomes
sc
sc sc
(4-5) indsc
̃ )) ∙ ρθqsc
̃ sc q̃sc }.
rp = max{0, min(2pg , max(pg , p
APH ) − p

If the anticipated revenue at the harvest time from planting the second crop, p̃sc q̃sc , is
sc sc
greater than covered revenue, min(2psc
̃ )) ∙ ρθqsc
g , max(pg , p
APH ), the farmer does not

receive the revenue protection indemnity.
Assuming that the farmer is risk averse, s/he will choose not to plant a second crop
when u(πpp ) > EU(π
̃sc ), and s/he will plant a second crop when u(πpp ) < EU(π
̃sc ), where
u(∙) is a strictly increasing twice-continuously differentiable utility function and EU(∙) is the

10

A second crop is planted after the late planting date. In the case of corn in Iowa, the normal
planting date is May 31, and the late planting date is June 25. The second crop, usually soybeans,
is planted after June 25, which is a second crop’s late planting period (See Figure 4-1).
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expectation of the utility function. Data (OIG 2013) reveals that 99.9% acres associated
with a PP claim are planted to a cover crop, not a second crop, which implies
(4-6) u(πpp ) > EU(π
̃sc ).
Meanwhile, conditional on the information known to the farmer at t = 1 , the
expected utility is rewritten as EU(π
̃sc ) = u(E(π
̃sc ) − RPM), where E(π
̃sc ) is the farmer’s
expected value of π
̃sc , and RPM is the risk premium assuming s/he is a risk averter
(Chavas, 2004, p.36). Since u(∙) is strictly increasing in πpp and π
̃sc , equation (4-6) can
be written as
(4-7)

πpp > E(π
̃sc ) − RPM.
We can simulate the farmer’s decision-making process using stochastic

simulation, i.e., generating random price, p̃sc and yield, q̃sc , for α = 0.35. We expect
equation (4-7) holds for most cases of our simulation, which is consistent with OIG (2013).
The expression in equation (4-7) cannot be solved analytically for α due to the complexity
of the decision making problem. The stochastic simulation is undertaken with various
values of α and the probability of choosing PP determined such that
(4-8)

Pr(PP|α) = Pr( πpp > E(π
̃sc ) − RPM|α).

Specifically, the stochastic simulation enables us to find the value of α such that πpp =
E(π
̃sc ) − RPM, i.e., farmers are indifferent between choosing PP and SC.
4.4. Representative Farmer and Stochastic Simulation
A stochastic simulation of representative farmer is used in this study. Simulation
of the representative farmer’s behavior on crop insurance is not original to this paper.
Babcock and Hennessy (1996) and Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga (2000) have previously
created a representative farmer.
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4.4.1. Representative Farmer
The representative farmer is created based on corn and soybean budget data from
Hamilton County, Iowa. For the simulation, historical corn and soybean price and yield,
insurance premium including subsidies associated with different insurance plans, and
farming cost data are compiled from Iowa extension, RMA quick cost estimator, and USDA
NASS (Table 4-1). There are a total of 48 different crop insurance plans pertaining to two
different insurance types (revenue protection and yield protection), three different PP
coverages,θpp , (60%, 65%, and 70%), and eight different insurance coverages,θ, (50%,
55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85%). To simplify the comparisons, the
representative farmer is assumed to choose a single crop insurance plan for a second
crop, and thus results for a total of six crop insurance plans are presented (simulations
were done for all of possible crop insurance plans).
4.4.2. Risk Premium
The risk premium,RPM, in Table 4-1 is derived assuming a negative exponential
utility function as follows,
1. Generate random soybean price and yield, p̃sc and q̃sc , at harvest time considering
correlation, corr(p̃sc , q̃sc ) (Richardson et al. 2000).
2. Calculate profit from a second crop, π
̃ sc, including possible insurance indemnity
associated with this second crop.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for 1000 times.
4. Calculate the certainty equivalent (CE) using simulated profit from step 3 using the
formula, CE(r) =

1
ln[(1000 ∑ exp(−r ∙

−

1
r

πi )) ], where i represents each iteration and

r is the absolute risk aversion coefficient (Hardarker et al. 2004, p. 257).
5. Derive the risk premium following the definition, RPM = E(π
̃sc ) − u−1 (EU(π
̃sc ))
(Chavas 2004, p. 34) which is equivalent to RPM = E(π
̃sc ) − CE(r).
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Table 4-1. Representative Corn-Soybeans Farmer in Hamilton County, Iowa
Symbols
PP coverage level
Coverage level
LP reduction factor
PP indemnity reduction factor
Corn elected price1
Corn APH2
Soybeans elected price3
Volatility of soybean price4
Soybeans APH2
Soybeans late planting yield5
St. dev. of soybean yield
Corn insurance premium

No
Insurance

θpp
θ
ρ
α
pfc
g
qfc
APH
psc
g

-

qsc
APH

20 bu 6

mfc

-

Choice of Insurance for Second Crop
Yield Protection
Revenue Protection
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
60%
65%
70%
60%
65%
70%
65%
75%
85%
65%
75%
85%
0.89
0.35
$4.62/bushel
189 bushels/acre
$11.36/bushel
0.13
50 bushels/acre
26.5 bushels/acre
4.46 bushels/acre
7
11
17
10
19
37

Corn insurance subsidy7

-

0.59

0.55

0.38

0.59

0.55

0.38

Additional premium for buy-up PP8

-

0

0.22

0.85

0

0.22

0.85

-

5
0.59

9
0.55

Soybeans insurance premium
Soybeans subsidy rate7
Cost at time period 1($/acre)
Cost at time period 2($/acre)

m

sc

16
7
13
25
0.38
0.59
0.55
0.38
$327.8/acre
c1fc
$186.65/acre
c2sc
Corr. Bet/ soybeans price and yield9
-0.24
10
Utility function
u(π) = −exp(−rπ)
0.005
Risk aversion parameter11
r
6.88
Risk Premium
RPM
3.85
3.65
3.72
2.14
2.13
2.64
1 The elected corn price is $4.62/bushel in 2014 and is considered as the average price. It is given
by the RMA based on historical corn futures price data. 2 Trend adjusted APH. 3 The elected
soybean price is $11.36/bushel in 2014 and is considered as average price. It is calculated by the
RMA based on historical soybean futures price data. 5 53% (Pedersen, 2008, Iowa Extension) of
average soybean yield from normal planting due to potential yield loss from late planting. 6 If a
farmer doesn’t purchase crop insurance for a second crop, the farmer must plant a second crop
after the late planting date of the second crop, usually July 10 in Iowa (Edwards, 2012, Iowa
Extension). In this case, the potential yield loss would be 40% of the normal yield. 7 The insured
is responsible for (1 – coverage subsidy rate)×insurance premium. Federal government pays
coverage subsidy rate×insurace premium. 8 For example, a farmer in Hamilton County, Iowa
should pay $11.37+$0.57 to purchase buy-up of 10% PP (70% coverage) with 85% coverage
level. Additional insurance premiums for buy-up PP differs by counties. If a farmer chooses to
plant a second crop, s/he will get 65% of the insurance premium back. 9 For numerical simulation,
soybean price and yield are generated randomly based on the correlation between price and yield.
The correlation is calculated using historical data from 1990 to 2005. 10 Negative exponential
utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), which is given by r. This function
has been used extensively in decision analysis (Hardaker et al. 2004, p.103). 11 When r = 0, the
decision maker is risk neutral and higher values of r imply risk averse decision makers. We select
r = 0.005 as the risk aversion coefficient based on Table 2 in Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman
(1993). The risk aversion coefficient of 0.005 denotes a relatively risk averse farmer (risk premium
20% Table 2).
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4.5. Stochastic Simulation
Once RPM is calculated for the second crop with different insurance types and
coverages including no crop insurance for the second crop, πpp and E(π
̃sc ) − RPM are
compared assuming α = 0.35 and given various combinations of random prices (p̃sc ) and
yields (q̃sc ) for the second crop. Random prices and yields are generated based on the
correlation between p̃sc and q̃sc to maintain a simultaneous price-quantity relationship
(Richardson et al. 2000).
Table 4-2 presents our simulation results. As expected, in most cases PP is
chosen over SC. The probability of choosing PP varies between 81% and 96%. However,
the probability of choosing PP is not 99.9% when the farmer purchases crop insurance for
a second crop. This is because assigning 60% of the approved yield of the first crop in the
APH calculation is not considered explicitly. Assignment of 60% of the approved yield to
APH calculation may increase the insurance premium and may reduce the expected
indemnity for the next crop year for the first crop. The probability of choosing PP in this
case would be higher because the corresponding RPM would be larger than before.

̃ 𝐬𝐜 ) − 𝐑𝐏𝐌 |𝛂 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟓) from Stochastic Simulation
Table 4-2. 𝐏𝐫(𝛑𝐩𝐩 > 𝐄(𝛑
Choice of Insurance for Second Crop
No
Insurance
PP coverage level, θpp
Insurance coverage level, θ
Pr(πpp > E(π̃sc ) − RP |α = 0.35)1
1

100%

Yield Protection

Revenue Protection

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

60%

65%

70%

60%

65%

70%

65%

75%

85%

65%

75%

85%

85%

93%

96%

81%

86%

91%

Probability of choosing PP and not to plant a second crop. The higher coverage, the higher
probability of choosing PP because the higher coverage (of the first crop) provides the more PP
payment.
Note: choice of insurance plan for the second crop is assumed to be the same for the first crop or
not purchase insurance for the second crop.
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Another set of stochastic simulations is conducted to determine appropriate values
of α that might encourage farmers to plant a second crop. As shown in Figure 4-2, the
probability of choosing PP decreases when the farmer faces higher values of α. From
Figure 4-2, the probability of choosing PP depends on type of crop insurance and
insurance coverage level. In the case of revenue protection, there exists a tipping point
where the probability of choosing PP would reach zero at roughly when α = 0.6. Beyond
this point most of farmers choose to plant a second crop. This is because revenue
protection insurance now guarantees the minimum revenue. At some points, i.e., α ≥ 0.6,
the profit from a second crop is greater than πpp all the time, i.e., truncated over various
levels of crop insurance coverages. In the case of yield protection, however, the insurance
guarantees only yield, not the revenue from a second crop, and thus the farmer is not
guaranteed minimum revenue.
Results presented in Figure 4-2 demonstrate some policy implications associated
with PP provision. First, the current PP reduction factor is too low to induce farmers to
plant a second crop, which impedes reaching USDA’s goal of promoting agricultural
production. Second, the optimal reduction factor depends upon the type of insurance and
insurance coverage. Crop insurance coverage data for 2014 (based on the number of
policies with premium from Pregenerated SOB Reports in RMA Summary of Business
Reports and Data, http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html) show that close to 90% of
farmers purchase revenue protection. Farmers who purchase revenue protection choose
coverage levels of 70%(15%), 75%(25%), 80%(24%), and 85%(18%).
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Figure 4-2. Probability of PP under various PP reduction factor (𝛂)
Note: Green color = farmer tends to choose second crop, red color = farmer tends to choose more
PP. Numbers in colored cells represent the probability of choosing PP.
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In addition, according to PP indemnity data (from Indemnities with Month of Loss in RMA
Cause of Loss, http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/cause.html), most farmers choose either
base PP or 10% buy-up PP. Base PP accounted for 61% of total PP indemnity, and 10%
buy-up PP 38% in 2013.
In sum, the most popular choice of crop insurance type and coverage in recent
years has been 75-80% covered revenue protection with base PP. This study estimates
an optimal reduction factor of 0.45-0.50, which induces most farmers to plant a second
crop. In cases where a farmer does not purchase crop insurance for a second crop, the
farmer most often chooses to claim PP, not to plant a second crop. This is because the
risk of planting a second crop is much higher without insurance. In turn, the farmer faces
a much higher risk premium, which discourages him/her from planting the second crop.
The probability of claiming PP is simulated to be close to one until the value of α becomes
very high like 0.6.
4.6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
If a farmer chooses prevented planting (PP), s/he receives a PP indemnity and may
either leave the acreage unplanted or plant a second crop. e.g., soybean for corn. If the
farmer plants a second crop after having chosen not to plant a first crop, s/he receives a
reduced PP payment (35% of PP indemnity) and is assigned to 60% of the approved yield
of the first crop in the APH for the next crop year. The current PP provision fails to provide
farmers with an incentive to plant a second crop (99.9% of PP claiming farmers do not
plant a second crop). Adjusting the PP indemnity payment may encourage farmers to plant
a second crop, which is currently fixed at 35% of the total PP indemnity.
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The objective in this study is to estimate the optimal percentage reduction in PP
payment that may encourage farmers to plant a second crop. Assuming a relatively risk
averse farmer, we derive the probability of choosing PP using corn-soybean budget data
in Hamilton County, Iowa. Using stochastic simulation based upon a negative exponential
utility function, and the current reduction factor, most farmers choose not to plant a second
crop (Table 4-2). However, if the reduction factor increases, the farmer begins planting a
second crop (Figure 4-2).
Policy implications regarding PP provision in crop insurance are twofold. First, the
current PP reduction factor is not inducing farmers to plant a second crop, which conflicts
with USDA’s goal of promoting agricultural production. Second, the optimal reduction
factor depends upon insurance coverage and type. The most popular choice of crop
insurance type and coverage in recent years has been 75-80% coverage revenue
protection with base PP. This study suggests an optimal reduction factor of 0.45-0.50
(from Figure 4-2), which may induce most of farmers to plant a second crop.
An obvious extension of this study would be a statistical test of our simulation
results using historical data for insurance type and coverage, and the planting of a second
crop. However, statistical analysis is precluded because of 99.9% of farmers chose not to
plant a second crop. In addition, the suggest of PP payment rate of 0.45-0.50 is based
upon parameterization for a single crop in a single place (Hamilton County, Iowa) where
the corn yields tend to be high. Thus, related numerical analysis with parameterization for
multiple locations should be conducted.
Additionally, in this study, the representative farmer is assumed to be relatively risk
averse with a negative exponential utility function. In reality, however, a farmer’s attitude
toward risk and the type of utility function are unknown to researchers. If farmers are more
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risk averse than the representative farmer, the risk premium (RPM), would be higher and
the value of α may also be higher than that of suggested here.
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5. MARGIN PROTECTION PROGRAM FOR DAIRY: CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
AND CHOICE OF MARGIN PROTECTION

Summary
The Margin Protection Program for dairymen (MPP-Dairy) provides dairy
producers with insurance coverage (indemnity) when the national dairy margin (all milk
price minus feed costs) falls beneath a producer-selected threshold level beginning at the
catastrophic level of $4/cwt, requiring a $100 administration fee. Buy-up or supplementary
coverage levels incurring additional premium costs are also offered in increments of
$0.50/cwt, beginning at $4.5/cwt up to $8.0/cwt. MPP-Dairy enrollment data
(http://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/Dairy-MPP/index)

indicates

that

California, the nation’s largest dairy producing state, has only 29% of enrolled dairy farms
purchasing supplementary coverage. In contrast, Wisconsin, the second largest dairy
producing state, has 56% of enrolled producers purchasing buy-up coverage. This paper
determines whether conditional probabilities regarding regional and national margins play
a role in dairymen’s decisions to purchase supplementary coverage. Results indicate that
Wisconsin producers exhibit larger probabilities of purchasing supplementary coverage
conditional on regional and national margins than do California producers.

Key Words: MPP-Dairy, Expected utility, Copula, conditional probability
JEL Codes: D81, Q14, Q18
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5.1. Introduction
The Dairy Margin Protection Program (MPP-Dairy), administered by the Farm
Service Agency (FSA USDA), is a risk management tool for dairy producers that
addresses the income-over-feed-costs (IOFC) margin risk. The 2014 Farm Bill authorized
the MPP-Dairy (FSA 2014), which offers dairy farms protection of their production margins.
The MPP-Dairy includes catastrophic coverage, at no cost to the producer other than an
annual $100 administrative fee. Various levels of buy-up coverage are offered with
premiums that vary with the level of protection (Newton, Thraen, and Bozic 2015).
Catastrophic coverage provides payments to participating dairy producers when the
national dairy production margin is below $4/cwt. The national production margin is the
difference between the monthly average all-milk price and monthly average feed costs
(which includes the costs of corn, soybean, meal and alfalfa) (Newton, Thraen, and Bozic
2015). Producers may purchase buy-up coverage for national margins that range from
$4.50/cwt to $8.00/cwt, rising by increments of $0.50. Producers receive indemnity
payments when the actual margins (between $4.50 and $8.00/cwt) are below their
selected margin level (Newton, Thraen, and Bozic 2015). The program’s objective is to
offer dairy producers (regardless of their size, geographic location, or management
practices) self-selected protection levels against declines in milk prices, rising feed costs,
or a mixture of both (Newton and Thraen 2014; Newton, Thraen, and Bozic 2015).
2015 MPP-Dairy coverage data by states indicate that, for western states other
than Washington and Montana, less than 36% of those enrolled in the program purchase
buy-up protection. California (CA), which is the largest dairy producing state in the U.S.,
has only 29% of enrolled dairy farms purchasing supplementary coverage (i.e. the majority
enrolled solely purchase catastrophic coverage). In contrast, more than 50% of dairy
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producers in mid-western and eastern states typically purchase buy-up coverage. For
example, Wisconsin (WI), the second largest dairy producing state in the U.S., has 56%
of enrolled producers purchasing supplementary coverage. Figure 5-1 shows the MPPDairy participation rates across different margin protection in CA and WI. As shown, the
distribution of MPP-Dairy participation rates differs in both regions. More than 70% of CA
dairy producers typically purchase catastrophic protection, while 44% of WI producers do
so. To the contrary, a larger percentage of WI dairy farms purchase buy-up coverage
levels of $6/cwt and $6.5/cwt, as well as the maximum protection level of $8/cwt.

Figure 5-1. MPP-Dairy participation rate and margin protection in CA and WI in 2015
Note: Participation rate is the proportion of dairy producers who purchase dairy margin protection.
$4/cwt is catastrophic coverage. Producers may purchase buy-up coverage that provides additional
payments when margins are between $4.00 and $8.00/cwt.
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The objective of this study is to investigate why WI dairy producers may have
purchased more supplementary coverages than CA dairy producers. There are several
potential factors explaining this difference, such as farm size (average size of dairy
operation in CA is much larger than that in WI), regional milk price, regional feed costs,
technology, and producers’ attitude toward risk. Newton and Balagtas (2015) explore the
MPP participation pattern focusing on farm size. They find that the enrollment rate is
positively associated with farm size across state. They also find that supplementary
coverage is negatively associated with farm size across state. This is because the $100
administration fee is relatively smaller for larger dairy producers. Thus, states with larger
farms tend to exhibit higher participation rates (Newton and Balagtas 2015).
This study attempts to answer this question from a different perspective by
demonstrating that the dairy production margins in particular the conditional probabilities
among the national and each local market, may play a key role in determining which farms
are more likely to purchase supplementary coverage. This is due to the fact that the dairy
farms receive payments when the national (average) dairy production margin is below
their selected margin protection level. If a dairy farm can accurately estimate the extent of
the relationship between the US margin and her/his own margin, i.e., if the farmer can
estimate how closely the US margin ‘tracks’ the changes in her/his margin, then the farm
has an incentive to increase its selected protection rate and purchase a buy-up option.
Expected utility theory, which is used extensively in the insurance literature, is used
to characterize the role of the conditional probability in the decision to purchase buy-up
coverage. The level of margin protection is modeled as a function of the conditional
probability between the margins of US and CA, or between the margins of US and WI,
whichever the case may be. Comparative statics reveal that there exists a positive
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relationship between margin protection buy-up and the conditional probability defined over
the national and local margins. The empirical conditional probability is derived using
different copula models to see whether WI farms have larger conditional probabilities than
CA farms.
Section 5-2 reviews the literature regarding the MPP-Dairy. The conceptual model
for choice of margin protection and the role of conditional probability is described in section
5-3. Section 5-4 explores the various copula models used to calculate conditional
probabilities of dairy production margins between US-CA and US-WI. Section 5-5
describes the data used. Section 5-6 presents the empirical methods to derive conditional
probabilities between US-CA and US-WI. Results are discussed in Section 5-7. Section
5-8 provides a summary.
5.2. Literature Review
Few studies have investigated the MPP-Dairy. A handful of Farmdoc publications,
such as those by Newton and Thraen (2014), Newton and Bozic (2014), and Newton and
Balagtas (2015) address the MPP-Dairy. This is partly because the MPP-Dairy is a
relatively new policy option included in the 2014 Farm Bill.
Newton and Thraen (2014) describe the MPP-Dairy as a “dairy safety net”. Newton
and Bozic (2014) evaluate milk prices needed to trigger the MPP-Dairy. Newton and
Balagtas (2015) explore the MPP-Dairy participation pattern focusing on farm size. They
find that the enrollment rate is positively related with farm size across states. They also
find that supplementary coverage is negatively associated with farm size across state.
This is because the $100 administration fee is relatively small for larger dairy producers.

72

Thus, states with larger farms tend to exhibit higher participation rates (Newton and
Balagtas 2015).
Newton, Thraen, and Bozic (2015) argue that MPP-Dairy leads to higher taxpayer
cost compared with prior dairy support programs. Two reasons are suggested. First, dairy
farmers may accurately predict the national dairy margins using publicly available
information from futures markets, which allows them to maximize program returns.
Second, a general lack of production constraints shifts benefits toward larger dairy farms
and causes a larger taxpayer burden.
Regarding the dairy production margin, which is defined as the difference between
all-milk price and feed costs, Bozic et al. (2012) finds that the dairy margin exhibits a slow
mean-reverting property when margins are very high or very low. Their findings can be
used to design risk management strategies for managing margins, especially in a futures
market.
Bozic et al. (2014) explore the method used to determine the Livestock Gross
Margin Insurance for Dairy Cattle (LGM-Dairy), which is the nation’s prior dairy support
program. They point out that the current rate-making method using a Gaussian copula
fails to capture crucial features of milk and feed markets. They find that, since 2005, the
dependence between milk and corn prices became stronger compared to 1990~2005.
This is because the number of larger dairy farms (> 1000 dairy cattle) has increased over
time, and most of large farms purchase their feed from grain markets. This causes stronger
tail dependence, which is not accounted for by the Gaussian copula.
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5.3. Conceptual Model
Suppose a dairy farm located in region j chooses a level of margin protection, m
̅ j.
To make the problem simple, suppose there are four discrete states of nature (SON)
governing the US and region jth margins, i.e., S = {S1 , S2 , S3 , S4 }. In SON S1 the US margin
H
exceeds the producer’s chosen margin of protection (m
̅ j < mH
us ) denoted by mus , and
11
region jth’s margin is also high (mj = mH
j ) as well. Under S1 no MPP-Dairy payment is

made. In SON S2 , the US margin is lower than producer’s protection margin (m
̅ j > mLus ) ,
and region jth’s margin is again high (mj = mH
j ). In this case, the producer receives an
MPP-Dairy payment (per-unit of production) of αj (m
̅ j − mLus ), where α is the coverage
level (from 25% to 90%). In SON S3 , the US margin is again high (mus = mH
us ) but region
jth’s margin is low (mj = mLj ). In SON S4 , both the US and regional jth’s margins are low.
The dairy farm is paid αj (m
̅ j − mLus ). Figure 5-2 presents these four SONs.

US Margins (mus)

Regional Margins (mj )

Higher than m
̅

Lower than m
̅

High

S1

S2

Low

S3

S4

Figure 5-2. State of nature
Note: US margin is high when m
̅ < mus and the dairy farm doesn’t receive MPP-Dairy payments.
US margin is low when m
̅ > mus and the dairy farm receives MPP-Dairy payments.

11

Discretizing margins as high vs. low helps to make the model tractable. A high regional margin
is defined as a margin exceeding the (historical) average, while a low regional margin is defined as
a margin below the (historical) average. A high US margin occurs when the US margin exceeds a
farmer selected threshold. A low US margin occurs when the US margin is lower than the farmer
selected threshold.
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The corresponding MPP-Dairy premium (per unit of production) is calculated as
Pj = αj πus (m
̅ j − mLus ), where P is the premium per unit of production for dairy farm to
participate in the MPP-Dairy program ‘buy-up’ program, αj is chosen coverage level, and
πus = Pr(mus = mLus ) . 12 The corresponding wealth for the dairy farm (per unit of
production) located in region j for the SONs is provided in the second column of Table 51. Here w0 represents the producer’s initial wealth level. In S1 , for instance, the dairy farm
receives no MPP-Dairy payment but s\he has a high dairy margin, so the wealth is w0 −
Pj + mH
j . In S2 , the producer receives a MPP-Dairy payments with a high dairy margin, so
the wealth is w0 − Pj + mH
̅ j − mLus ). In S3 , the dairy farm doesn’t receive payments
j + αj (m
and s\he has a low dairy margin as well, so the wealth is w0 − Pj + mLj . Lastly, in S4 , the
dairy farm receives the payment with a low dairy margin, so the wealth is w0 − Pj + mLj +
αj (m
̅ j − mLus ).

Table 5-1. Wealth and Probability for Four States of Nature
SON
S1

Wealth
w0 − Pj +

S2

w0 − Pj +

S3

w0 − Pj +

S4

w0 − Pj +

mH
j
mH
̅ j − mLus )
j + αj (m
mLj
mLj + αj (m
̅ j − mLus )

Probability
π1 = 1 − πus − πj + πj πus|j
π2 = πus − πj πus|j
π3 = πj − πj πus|j
π4 = πj πus|j

Note: SON = state of nature.
L
H
π1 = Pr(S1 ), π2 = Pr(S2 ) = Pr(mus = mLus , mj = mH
j ), π3 = Pr(S3 ) = Pr(mus = mus , mj = mj ), and
π4 = Pr(S4 ) = Pr(mus = mLus , mj = mLj ), where πus = Pr(mus = mLus ), πj = Pr(mj = mLj ), and πus|j =
Pr(mus = mLus |mj = mLj ).

12

MPP-Dairy premium rates are fixed at predetermined levels for the duration of the farm bill
(Newton, Thraen and Bozic 2015). This research assumes that these fixed premium rates are
calculated as Pj = αj πus (m
̅ − mLus ), which satisfies the equivalence principle, i.e., expected MPPDairy payment = premium.
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The third column of Table 5-1 presents the associated probabilities for each of
SON, where πus = Pr(mus = mLus ) , πj = Pr(mj = mLj ) , and πus|j = Pr(mus = mLus |mj =
mLj ). The probability of S4 can be therefore written as π4 = Pr(S4 ) = Pr(mus = mLus , mj =
mLj ) = πj πus|j using Bayes’ Theorem Pr(mus = mLus |mj = mLj ) =
πus|j =

Pr(S4 )
.
πj

L
Pr(mus =mL
us ,mj =mj )

Pr(mj =mL
j)

↔

Likewise, the probability of S3 is given by π3 = Pr(S3 ) = Pr(mus = mH
us , mj =

mLj ) = πj − πj πus|j , and the probability of S2 is given by π2 = Pr(S2 ) = Pr(mus = mLus , mj =
mH
j ) = πus − πj πus|j . The probability of S1 , in turn, can be written as π1 = Pr(S1 ) = 1 −
Pr(S2 ) − Pr(S3 ) − Pr (S4 ) = 1 − πus − πj + πj πus|j .
Assuming a risk averse dairy producer with a strictly twice-continuously
differentiable utility function, the maximization of the producer’s expected utility function is
given by
H
(5-1) max EUj = π1 u(w0 − Pj + mH
̅ j − mLus )) +
j ) + π2 u (w0 − Pj + mj + αj (m
̅j
m

π3 u(w0 − Pj + mLj ) + π4 u (w0 − Pj + mLj + αj (m
̅ j − mLus ))
subject to Pj = αj πus (m
̅ j − mLus ).
Given αj , the producer’s first order condition ( j subscript is omitted for expository
convenience) is given by,
(5-2)

∂EU
̅
∂m

= −απus π1 u′ (1) + α(1 − πus )π2 u′ (2) − απus π3 u′ (3) + α(1 − πus )π4 u′ (4) = 0. 13

H
"1" = w0 − Pj + mH
̅ j − mus ), "3" = w0 − Pj + mLj , and "4" = w0 − Pj +
j , "2" = w0 − Pj + mj + αj (m
mLj + αj (m
̅ j − mus ).
13
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L
The optimal solution is denoted m
̅∗ = m
̅ (πus , πj , πus|j , w0 , αj , mus , mH
j , mj ) if an interior

solution exists14. The second order condition for a local maximum satisfies,
(5-3)

∂2 EU
̅2
∂m

= α2 π2us π1 u′′ (1) + α2 (1 − πus )2 π2 u′′ (2) + α2 π2us π3 u′′ (3) + α2 (1 − πus )2 π4 u′′ (4) < 0,

which holds automatically by our underlying assumption of risk aversion.

By implicit function theorem,

(5-4)

∂2 EU
̅ ∂πus|j
∂m

̅ ∗ (∙)
∂m
∂πus|j

=−

∂2 EU
̅̅̅ ∂πus|j
∂m
∂2 EU
̅̅̅2
∂m

, where the numerator satisfies

= −απj πus u′ (1) − απj (1 − πus )u′ (2) + απj πus u′ (3) + απj (1 − πus )u′ (4)

→ απj πus (u′ (3) − u′ (1)) + απi (1 − πus )(u′ (4) − u′ (2)) > 0,
which again holds automatically by our underlying assumption of risk aversion. Thus,

(5-5)

̅ ∗ (∙)
∂m
∂πus|j

=−

∂2 EU
̅̅̅ ∂πus|j
∂m
∂2 EU
̅̅̅2
∂m

> 0.

In words, when the conditional probability, πus|j = Pr(mus = mLus |mj = mLj ), increases, the
dairy producer chooses a higher margin protection level.
Now the question becomes how to identify empirically the conditional probabilities,
πus|j . We use the Copula method. Copula models are flexible forms that can be used to
estimate dependence structures among (stochastic) variables, here, dairy production
margins.
5.4. Copula Theory
Copulas are functions that “join or couple multivariate distribution functions to their
marginal distribution functions” (Nelson 2006). According to Nelson (2006), Copula

14

All the dairy producers are assumed to purchase margin protection. This is not unrealistic since
dairy producers can purchase catastrophic level with no premium other than $100 administration
fee.
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functions provide a flexible dependence structure among N-dimensional multivariate joint
distribution that can take any distributional form. Consider a continuous N-dimensional
multivariate joint distribution function F(x1 , x2 , … , xN ) with univariate marginal distributions
−1
F1 (x1 ), ⋯ , FN (xN ) and inverse probability transforms (quantile functions), F1−1 , ⋯ , FN
.

Then xi = Fi−1 (ui ) ~ Fi, i = 1, ⋯ , N, where ui is a uniformly distributed variable. Hence,
(5-6)

−1 (u ))
F(x1 , x2 , … , xN ) = F (F1−1 (u1 ), F2−1 (u2 ), … , FN
= C(u1 , u2 , … , uN ).
N

By Sklar’s Theorem (Sklar 1973), copula function C(∙) allows a dependence structure
among marginal distributions by introducing dependence parameter, θ, in the copula
function:
(5-7)

F(x1 , x2 , … , xN ) = C(u1 , u2 , … , uN | θ),

where θ is a scalar-valued dependence parameter.
5.4.1. Classes of Copula Functions
Most copula research to date focuses on bivariate copulas, because extensions to
higher dimensions introduce nontrivial restrictions on dependence (Zimmer 2012).
Following Zimmer (2012), the bivariate copula is applied in this study. Generally, there are
two types of copulas, i) Elliptical and ii) Archimedean. Elliptical copulas are symmetrical in
shape (Meyer 2009), which include Gaussian (normal) copula and student’s t copulas.
The Bivariate Gaussian copula, Cg , with a dependence parameter θ, is written as
(5-8)

Cg (u1 , u2 |θ) = Φ(Φ−1 (u1 ), Φ−1 (u2 )|θ)
Φ−1 (u1 )

=∫
−∞

Φ−1 (u2 )

∫
−∞

−s2 + 2θst − t 2
exp {
} dsdt,
2(1 − θ2 )
2π√(1 − θ2 )
1

where Φ is a cumulative standard normal distribution, θ ∈ (−1,1) , and u1 and u2 are
uniformly distributed variables (Zimmer 2012). The Gaussian copula exhibits asymptotic
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independence, i.e., dependence approaches zero in upper and lower tail areas
(Embrechts, Frey, and McNeil 2005). The Gaussian copula has been used widely in
finance due to its simplicity and familiarity (Zimmer 2012).
The Bivariate student’s t copula, Ct , with θ ∈ (−1,1) and degrees of freedom υ, is
written as
(5-9)

−1
Ct (u1 , u2 |θ, υ) = t θ ,υ (t −1
υ (u1 ), t υ (u2 )|θ, υ)
t−1
υ (u1 )

=∫
−∞

t−1
υ (u2 )

∫
−∞

−(υ+2)
2

−s 2 + 2θst − t 2
{1 +
}
υ(1 − θ2 )
2π√(1 − θ2 )
1

dsdt,

where t θ ,υ is the cumulative student’s distribution function with degrees of freedom υ and
dependence parameter θ . u1 and u2 are again uniformly distributed variables. The
student’s t copula has a symmetric pattern in the upper and lower tail areas and has tail
dependence in upper and lower tail areas. Both the Gaussian and student’s t copulas
make use of Pearson linear correlation coefficient as a dependence parameter. There
exists a strong negative dependence between two random variables when θ approaches
-1, and a strong positive dependence when θ approaches 1.
Archimedean copulas such as Gumbel and Clayton can identify asymmetric
dependence in lower (Clayton) or upper tails (Gumbel). A bivariate Gumbel copula, Cgum
with a dependence parameter θ, is
(5-10)

Cgum (u1 , u2 |θ) = exp (−((− log u1

)θ

)θ

1
θ

+ (− log u2 )) ,

where the dependence parameter is restricted to θ ∈ [1, ∞). If two random variables are
independent, θ approaches 1. When two random variables are strongly dependent, θ
approaches infinity. The Gumbel copula exhibits asymmetric upper tail dependence.
The bivariate Clayton copula, Cc with a dependence parameter θ is written as

79

(5-11)

−

1

θ
Cc (u1 , u2 |θ) = (u1−θ + u−θ
2 − 1) ,

where the dependence parameter is restricted to θ ∈ (0, ∞). If two random variables are
independent, θ approaches 0. Conversely, if two random variables are strongly
dependent, θ approaches to infinity. The Clayton copula exhibits a lower tail dependence.
Copulas can be derived from combinations of individual copulas to better fit the
data. A mixture copula with two different copulas can be written as
(5-12)

Cm (u1 , u2 |p, θ1 , θ2 ) = pC1 (u1 , u2 |θ1 ) + (1 − p)C2 (u1 , u2 |θ2 ),

where, p is the proportional contribution of the first copula to the mixture copula, and C1
and C2 are different two copulas (Zimmer 2012). This type of mixture copula can capture
lower and upper tail dependence if Gumbel and Clayton copulas are used (Zimmer 2012).
5.4.2. Dependence Parameter
The dependence parameter, θ , in Elliptical copulas is simply a (Pearson)
correlation coefficient. Dependence parameters of Archimedean copulas, however, are
somewhat ambiguous in measuring how two random variables are dependent, and not
directly comparable to dependence parameters from Elliptical copulas. The dependence
parameter,θ, may be converted to a Kendal’s rank correlation, τ, for direct comparison
with an Elliptical copula. Kendall’s rank correlation (𝜏) is restricted to values between
(−1,1) like the Pearson linear correlation, though it is not the same type of correlation (i.e.
rank vs. linear). Table 5-2 shows the relationship between Kendall’s τ and θ for various
copula functions.
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Table 5-2. Relationship between 𝛉 and 𝛕
Copula function

Dependence parameter
𝜃-domain

Kendall’s rank correlation 𝜏

Gaussian and Student’s t

−1 < 𝜃 < 1

2
arcsin(𝜃)
𝜋

Gumbel

1≤ 𝜃<∞

1 − 𝜃 −1

Clayton

0< 𝜃<∞

1−

2
𝜃+2

Source: Trivedi and Zimmer (2007) Table 2.1 revised.

5.5. Data
Monthly US average prices for all milk, corn, and alfalfa hay are obtained from the
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), USDA; and soybean meals prices are
compiled from Agricultural Marketing Services (AMS), USDA. All data ranges from
January 2000 to September 2015. Monthly CA and WI average prices for all milk and
alfalfa hay are obtained from NASS USDA, and monthly CA and WI average prices for
corn and soybean meals are obtained from AMS USDA. (NOTE: WI soybean meal prices
used are same as for the US national average, which are from Decatur, Illinois)
The dairy production margin, mi , is the difference between all milk price (in $/cwt)
and ‘converted feed’ cost (i.e. in $/cwt) of corn, soybean meal and alfalfa hay for region i
(5-13) mi = Pmilk,i − (1.078Pcorn,i + 0.0137Palfalfa,i + 0.00735PSBM,i ), i = US, CA, WI,
where, Pmilk is all milk price, Pcorn is corn price (per bushel), Palfalfa is alfalfa hay price (per
ton), and PSBM is soybean meal price (per ton).
Figure 5-3 shows the US, CA and WI margins from January 2000 to September
2015. As shown, US and WI margins move very closely together through time. The CA
margin is lower than that of US and WI in each period. Note that all three margins
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experienced steep drops to (below 4 $/cwt) in 2009 and 2012 Moreover, CA dairy

0

5

$/cwt

10

15

producers experienced negative margins in 2009 and 2012.

Jan-00 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 Jan-16
Date
M_US
M_WI

M_CA

Figure 5-3. Margin co-movement among US, CA, and WI
Note: Region i’s margin is calculated as mi = Pmilk − (1.078Pcorn + 0.0137Palfalfa + 0.00735PSBM ),
i = US, CA, and WI; Phillips-Perron test indicates that margins are stationary.

Table 5-3 presents basic statistics for milk price, feed cost and IOFC margins.
Average US and WI milk prices are aligned around $16.35/cwt. The average CA milk price
is roughly $1 less than those of US and WI. In contrast, CA (converted) average feed cost
is higher than that of US and WI by roughly $2 per cwt. The high feed cost in CA is likely
driven by the fact that large (commercial size) CA dairy farms purchase feed from directly
crop markets. CA dairy producers may be more sensitive to variation of crop prices. Since
CA has relatively low milk price and high feed cost, its IOFC margin is less than the
margins for US and WI. The average US IOFC margin was $8.57/cwt, WI $8.93/cwt, and
CA $5.21/cwt for 2000~2015.
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Table 5-3. Basic Statistics for Milk Price, Feed Cost and Margin for 2000-2015

Milk Price
($/cwt)

Converted
Feed Cost
($/cwt)

Margin
($/cwt)

Mean

St. Dev

Min

Max

US

16.37

3.67

11.00

25.70

WI

16.34

3.72

11.00

25.70

CA

15.01

3.49

9.92

23.62

US

7.81

3.03

3.95

15.12

WI

7.41

3.01

3.42

14.90

CA

9.80

3.53

5.14

17.76

US

8.57

2.63

2.25

15.62

WI

8.93

2.70

2.55

16.09

CA

5.21

2.64

-1.97

11.63

Note: Margin is calculated as mi = Pmilk − (1.078Pcorn + 0.0137Palfalfa + 0.00735PSBM ), i = US, CA,
and WI.

5.6. Empirical Methods
5.6.1. Specification of Marginal Distributions
The first step in copula modeling is to specify the marginal distribution functions,
F1 (m1 ) and F2 (m2 ), where m1 is the US IOFC margin and m2 is a regional (CA or WI)
dairy margin. An AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) model is used to eliminate the deterministic
components from the margin variables and to find the dependence structure between
margins (Zimmer 2012). The AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) model eliminates serial correlation and
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in margin variables as well. The AR(p)GARCH(1,1) model is given by
(5-14)

mi,t = βi,0 + βi,1 mi,t−1 + ⋯ + βi,p mi,t−p + εi,t ,

for i = US, CA, and WI. εi,t is an error term with zero mean and conditional variance,
(5-15)

σ2i,t = αi,0 + αi,1 ε2i,t−1 + δi σ2i,t−1 .
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After estimation, a new series m
̃ i is calculated as
(5-16)

m
̃ i,t =

ε̂i,t
̂i σ
√α
̂ i,0 +α
̂ i,1 ε̂2 i,t−1 +δ
̂ 2 i,t−1

.

The series m
̃ i,t is referred to as a filtered margin.
5.6.2. Copula Estimation
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used to estimate the dependence
parameter θ. The probability density function (pdf) is rewritten as
(5-17)

f(m
̃ us , m
̃ j ) = c(Fus (m
̃ us ), Fj (m
̃ j )|θ) =

d2 C(Fus (m
̃ us ), Fj (m
̃ j )|θ)
̃ us dm
̃j
dm

fus (m
̃ us )fj (m
̃ j ), j = CA, WI

MLE maximizes the natural logarithm of equation (5-17), summing all observations with
respect to θ. The Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) and Vuong test (Vuong 1989) are used
for the goodness of fit measures of different choice of copula functions following Zimmer
(2012).
5.6.3. Conditional Probability
The estimation of conditional probabilities for the US margin given the CA (or WI)
margin is the next estimation step. A conditional probability can be derived from copula
estimation. The conditional probability is given by
(5-18)

̂

̂ ̂

̂

̃ us,t <k,m
̃ j,t <k)
P(m
C(F (k),F (k)|θ)
̂(m
P
̃ us,t < k|m
̃ j,t < k) =
= us F̂ (k)j
, j = CA, WI.
̂ (m
̃ <k)
P
j,t

j

Equation (5-18) gives the probability that the US margin is less than k given that the CA
(or WI) margin is less than k. Similarly, for the case where the US margin exceeds k given
that CA (or WI) margin also exceeds k, the conditional probability is written as
(5-19)

̂

̂

̂

̂ ̂

̂

̃ us,t >k,m
̃ j,t >k)
P(m
1−Fus (k)−Fj (k)+C(Fus (k),Fj (k)|θ)
̂(m
P
̃ us,t > k|m
̃ j,t > k) =
=
.
̂ (m
̂ (k)
̃ >k)
P
1−F
j,t

j
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If the probability of (filtered) US margin conditional on (filtered) WI margin is larger
than the probability of (filtered) US margin conditional on (filtered) CA margin (for a
certain margin level k), WI dairy farmers tend to purchase (more) buy-up margin protection
as shown in equation (5-5), i.e.,

̅ ∗ (∙)
∂m
∂πus|j

> 0.

5.7. Results
5.7.1. Filtered Margins
Table 5-4 presents the estimation results for the AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) model in
equation (5-14). The 3 autoregressive terms for the US and WI margins, and the 2
autoregressive terms for the CA margin remove autocorrelation, which is confirmed using
a Breusch-Godfrey test (Breusch 1978; Godfrey 1978). A GARCH(1,1) eliminates
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in the margin variables, which is confirmed
using LM tests (Bollerslev 1986). Filtered margins m
̃ i,t (i = US, CA, WI) in equation (5-16)
appear to be approximately standard normal. Skewness and kurtosis (S-K) tests fail to
reject the null hypotheses that the distribution of the filtered margins are normal. In
addition, Chi square tests of variance fail to reject the null hypothesis that the respective
variances of the filtered margins are equal to 1.
Figure 5-4 presents scatterplots of filtered margins between US-CA and US-WI.
Both plots indicate that US-CA and US-WI exhibit strong positive relationships. US-WI
seems to have stronger correlation. Figure 5-5 reports comparisons between filtered
margin kernel density (blue lines) and normal density (red lines) functions. Figure 5-5
shows that each filtered margin, m
̃ it , is approximately distributed standard normal.
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Table 5-4. AR(P)-GARCH(1,1) Estimation Results

Constant (β0 )
ARMA
L1.AR (β1 )
L2.AR (β2 )
L3.AR (β3 )
ARCH
L.ARCH (α1 )
L.GARCH (δ)
Constant (α0 )
N
Log likelihood

(1)
US filtered margin
8.068***
(0.509)

(2)
CA filtered margin
5.462***
(0.728)

(3)
WI filtered margin
7.954***
(0.600)

1.660***
(0.090)
-0.960***
(0.149)
0.218**
(0.082)

1.387***
(0.074)
-0.480***
(0.0717)

1.692***
(0.094)
-1.006***
(0.148)
0.241**
(0.079)

0.218*
(0.102)
0.693***
(0.131)
0.0522
(0.036)
189
-191.22

0.0198
(0.022)
0.994***
(0.045)
-0.00565
(0.020)
189
-230.67

0.251*
(0.180)
0.653***
(0.131)
0.0595
(0.039)
189
-193.68

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*).

Figure 5-4. Scatter plot of filtered margins (US-CA and US-WI)
Note: Filtered margin (m
̃ it ) is the series with filtered out AR(p) and GARCH(1,1) components of the
margins, mit .

86

Figure 5-5. Filtered margin kernel density functions
Note: Filtered margin (m
̃ it ) is the series with filtered out AR(p) and GARCH(1,1) components of the
margins, mit .

5.7.2. Estimates of Dependence15
Table 5-5 reports estimates of the dependence parameter θ . Parameter θ is
converted to Kendall’s τ for comparison across different copulas. As shown in Table 5-5,
the correlation between US and WI filtered margins is generally larger than that between
US and CA filtered margins across (single) copulas. For the Gumbel/Clayton mixture,
estimates of τ are reported for each part of the mixture, with the proportion (p) accounted

15

Vector autoregressive (VAR) model is also used to estimates of dependence parameter. The
VAR model gives a similar result as AR(p)-GARCH(1,1).
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for by each component - in accordance with equation (5-12). The estimated proportion
pertaining to Clayton is estimated to be 0.46 for US-CA and 0.84 for US-WI, indicating
lower-tail dependence is stronger among US-WI filtered margins.
All standard errors reported in Table 5-4 are computed using a block bootstrapping
(Kreiss and Lahiri 2012). Eight overlapping blocks of 24 consecutive observations (which
provide two years of monthly margin data) are drawn from the original filtered margins.
The 8 times 24 observations provide a bootstrap sample of similar length to the original
data. The AR-GARCH and filtered margins are re-estimated using the bootstrap sample.
This process is repeated 500 times and standard errors are calculated.

Table 5-5. Estimates of Dependence (Kendall’s 𝛕)
Copula
Gaussian
τ̂

US-CA

US-WI

0.63***
(0.05)

0.78***
(0.04)

0.64***
(0.06)
9.03
(40.37)

0.78***
(0.31)
10.83
(18.15)

τ̂

0.61***
(0.14)

0.75***
(0.09)

τ̂

0.53***
(0.07)

0.72***
(0.06)

0.49***
(0.11)
0.74***
(0.20)
0.46*
(0.24)

0.50***
(0.03)
0.77***
(0.08)
0.84***
(0.22)

Student’s t
τ̂
Degrees of freedom
Gumbel

Clayton

Gumbel-Clayton Mixture
Gumbel τ̂
Clayton τ̂
Proportion due to
Clayton 𝑝̂

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*).
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5.7.3. Selection of Copula
Table 5-6 provides the values for the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) and Vuong
test statistics (Vuong 1989) to choose the best copula. Gaussian copula is selected for
both US-CA and US-WI filtered margins, based on having the smallest BIC. Student’s t
and Gaussian copulas are associated with relatively close BIC values. The Clayton copula
for US-CA, and Gumbel copula for US-WI produce the worst BIC results. Vuong test
results are also reported in Table 5-6 comparing each copula to the Gaussian copula. As
the test statistic follows a normal distribution, significant positive values indicate inferior fit
compared with the Gaussian copula. Taken together Vuong and BIC values indicate that
the Gaussian copula is superior to other copulas.
5.7.4. Conditional Probabilities
The conditional probabilities in equations (5-18) and (5-19) are calculated across
different values of k ∈ [−3,3] using the Gaussian copula. The k values can be interpreted
as the standard deviations of the filtered margins since m
̃ it are essentially the
standardized residuals from the AR-GARCH model. Figure 5-6 presents the conditional
probabilities associated with different values of the filtered margins. If filtered margin for
CA falls more than one standard deviation below its mean (k = −1), then the probability
that the US filtered margin drops more than one standard deviation below its mean is
approximately 0.65. In contrast, the conditional probability of the US margin subject to the
WI margin - for this same scenario - is approximately 0.80; which is roughly 23% points
larger than CA. The conditional probabilities decrease over the values of k, but the
differences between the conditional probabilities of CA and WI become larger as k
increases in magnitude.
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Table 5-6. Goodness of Fit Measures and Vuong Test Statistics
Copula model
Bayes information criteria
Gaussian
Student’s t
Gumbel
Clayton
Gumbel/Clayton mixture
Vuong test statistics
Gaussian
Student’s t
Gumbel
Clayton
Gumbel/Clayton mixture

US/CA

US/WI

850.56
852.87
869.08
899.89
859.35

667.89
670.31
715.76
707.75
704.56

0.68
1.60
2.95***
0.36

0.64
3.64***
2.28**
1.85*

Note: The smallest BIC value represents the best fit.
Vuong test statistics is z =

LR(θg ,θa )
√Nω

~N(0,1), where LR(θg , θa ) = Lg − La −

kg −ka
2

ln N, Lg = maximum

log likelihood of Gaussian copula, La = maximum log likelihood of alternative copula, k = number
of parameters to estimate in models, and N = number of observations. ω is the standard deviation
of ln

fg(xit |θg)
fa (xit |θa )

. Gaussian copula is preferred with significance level α if the z statistics exceeds the

positive (1 − α)-quantile of the N(0,1). A copula’s fit is inferior to the Gaussian copula’s at * 0.1, **
0.05, and *** 0.01 significance levels.
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Figure 5-6. Conditional probabilities from Gaussian copula
Note: Filtered margin (m
̃ it ) is the series filtered out AR(p) and GARCH(1,1) components of margins,
mit .
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5.8. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The MPP-Dairy program contained in the 2014 Farm Bill is a risk management tool
for dairy producers, offering protection of income-over-feed-cost (IOFC) margin, which is
defined as the difference between the all-milk price and average feed costs. The MPPDairy includes catastrophic and eight buy-up coverage levels with premiums that vary with
the level of protection. The program’s objective is to provide dairy producers (regardless
of size, geographic locations or management practices) self-selected protection levels
against drops in milk prices, rising feed costs, or a mixture of both.
2015 MPP-Dairy coverage data by states indicates that California (CA), which is
the largest dairy producing state in the U.S., has only 29% of the enrolled dairy producers
purchasing supplementary coverage (i.e. the majority enrolled purchase only catastrophic
coverage). In contrast, Wisconsin (WI), the second largest dairy producing state in the
U.S., has 56% of enrolled producers buying supplementary coverages (Figure 5-1). More
than 70% of CA dairy producers purchased solely catastrophic protection, while 44% of
WI producers enrolled only in catastrophic protection. Instead, WI dairy farms purchased
buy-up coverage levels of $6/cwt and $6.5/cwt, and even the maximum protection level of
$8/cwt (Figure 5-1).
The objective of the third essay has been to investigate why WI dairy producers
have purchased more supplementary coverage than CA producers. There are several
likely factors explaining this difference, such as farm size (average size of dairy operation
in CA is much larger than that of WI), regional milk price, regional feed costs, technology,
and producers’ attitudes toward risk. This study demonstrates that the relationships
between dairy production margins among US and CA and among US and WI, specifically
the conditional probabilities for the national and each local market, may play a key role in
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determining which producers purchase supplementary coverage. This is because farms
receive payments when the national (average) dairy production margin (not their state
margin) falls below their selected level of margin protection. If a dairy producer knows the
extent of the relationship between the US margin and her/his margin, i.e., if the producers
knows how closely the US margin ‘tracks’ the changes in her/his margin, then the producer
may have an incentive to increase his/her protection and purchase buy-up options.
Several different copula models are used to estimate the conditional probability of
US-CA and US-WI margins, such as Gaussian, Student’s t, Gumbel, Clayton and mixture
of Clayton-Gumbel. A AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) model is used to eliminate spurious finding due
to serial correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity from the series data. Filtered
margins are then obtained from the AR(p)-GARCH models. The filtered margins are
shown to be distributed normally. The Gaussian copula model is determined to fit the data
best via BIC and Vuong tests and the corresponding conditional probabilities are
calculated. Results indicate that the conditional probability of the US margin on the WI
margin is statistically stronger than that of the US margin conditional on the CA margin.
Expected utility theory developed in Section 5-3 tell us that WI dairy producers would
therefore tend to have higher self-selected margin protection.
One caveat emerges. Self-selected margin protection may depend heavily on farm
size (production size) and MPP-Dairy premiums. For example, CA producers are currently
paying higher premiums because their farm size is, on average, larger than that of WI. It
is possible for dairy producers in WI to select a higher level of MPP-Dairy.
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Agricultural insurance programs such as crop insurance and Dairy Margin
Protection program (MPP-Dairy) are managed by United State Department of Agriculture
(USDA). The objective of these programs is to help farmers to manage their financial risk.
Agricultural insurance programs have played important role for farmers in continuing their
farming stably. There are several issues in insurance programs such as moral hazard and
adverse selection which make insurance programs inefficient. Many economists and
policy analysts have conducted various studies on crop insurance. Among others three
board research gaps are identified in this research, namely 1) moral hazard in prevented
planting (PP) and late planting (LP), 2) decision making on PP and planting a second crop
(SC), and 3) role of conditional probability for selecting dairy margin protection level in
MPP-Dairy.
First study analyzes the existence of moral hazard within the choice of PP and LP.
The PP provision is defined as the “failure to plant an insured crop by the final planting
date due to adverse events” such as excess moisture or drought. If the farmer decides not
to plant the crop, (after appraised by an agency) the farmer receives a PP indemnity. LP
is an option for the farmer to plant the crop and still maintain the crop insurance when the
farmer fails to plant crop by the final planting date. However, by choosing LP option, the
farmer has to lower the insurance coverage level depending on the LP date due to
potential yield loss. Crop insurance may alter farmers’ decision choices in production in
making the selection of PP or LP. In other words, crop insurance can increase the
likelihood of PP claims even though farmers can choose LP. Under the assumption that
the farmer behaves to maximize expected utility, the simulation results show that the
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higher coverage level induces the claim of PP more. Also, revenue protection is likely to
claim more PP than yield protection when the farmers expect that anticipated price at the
harvest time is higher. Spatial panel models attest to the existence of moral hazard in PP
empirically.
Second study examines the incentives to choose second crop when the farmers
claim PP due to adverse events such as drought and excess moisture. If a farmer chooses
PP, s/he receives the PP indemnity and may either leave the acreage unplanted or plant
a second crop, e.g., soybean for corn. If the farmer plants a second crop after prevented
from planting a first crop, the farmer receives a reduced PP payment (35% of PP
indemnity) and s/he is assigned to the 60% of the approved yield of the first crop in the
APH for the next crop year. The current PP provision fails to provide farmers with an
incentive to plant a second crop (99.9% of PP claiming farmers do not plant the second
crop). It is a contradiction of the goal of USDA that promotes agricultural production to
improve food security. Adjusting PP indemnity payment may encourage farmers to plant
a second crop, which is currently fixed at 35% of the total PP indemnity.
The objective in the second study is to find and suggest the optimal percentage of
PP payment that may encourage farmers to plant a second crop. In doing so, the goal of
USDA to promote agricultural production is achieved. Using corn-soybean budget data in
Hamilton County, Iowa, the representative farmer is created. Using the stochastic
simulation, under the current reduction factor, most of farmers do not choose to plant a
second crop. However, if the reduction factor increases, the farmer begins planting the
second crop. This study suggests the optimal reduction factor would be around 45-50%.
Third study investigates the role of conditional probability of income-over-feed-cost
(IOFC) margin when the dairy producers choose the level of supplementary margin
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protection. MPP-Dairy administered by Farm Service Agency (FAS), USDA, is a risk
management tool for dairy producers. The 2014 Farm Bill authorized the MPP-Dairy which
offers dairy producers protection of their milk production margin. 2015 MPP coverage data
by state indicates that California (CA), the largest dairy producing state, had only 29% of
enrolled producers buying supplementary coverage. In contrast, Wisconsin (WI), the
second largest dairy producing state, had 56% of enrolled producers buying
supplementary coverage. More than 70% of CA dairy producers purchased catastrophic
protection, $4/cwt, while only 44% of WI producers enrolled in catastrophic protection.
The role of conditional probability between US IOFC margin and regional margin
is examined to explain regional differences in the choice of the buy-up levels. Copula
model reveals that the conditional probability of US IOFC margin subject to the margin in
WI is much stronger than that of US margin given in CA margin. Expected utility theory
reveals that WI dairy producers tend to have higher self-selected margin protection.
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